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ARTICLE
DILUTION
Clarisa Long*
Ever since the creation of federal dilution law, legal commentators have
expressed consternation about this variation of the trademark entitlement.
Prior to the advent of this form of protection, the owner of a mark could
recover for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act only if the com-
mercial use of its mark by someone else caused consumer confusion. By con-
trast, dilution grants trademark holders an injunctive remedy for the use of
their famous marks by another even when consumers are not confused. This
Article explores how federal dilution law is actually being judicially enforced.
To do so, it examines the enforcement rates of dilution claims in reported
cases and in unreported trademark filings. The data show that dilution has
not been as powerful a theory of infringement as one might expect. Judicial
enforcement of dilution law is not robust today and has been eroding over
time. Quantitative and qualitative data derived from published opinions
and from trademark infringement filings indicate that after a period of ini-
tial broad interpretation and sometimes even enthusiastic embrace of dilution
law, courts in recent years have become rather chary of it. The Article next
examines some reasons why this might be so and why trademark holders have
not fully adapted their pleading practices to these developments. The Article
then explores some of the implications of the judiciary's treatment of federal
dilution law.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the creation of federal dilution law, legal commentators
have expressed consternation about this variation of the trademark enti-
tlement.1 Dilution law has been called "absolute and unlimitable,"2 "pow-
* Max Mendel Shaye Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Columbia Law School.
Thanks to Graeme Dinwoodie, Jane Ginsburg, Scott Hemphill, Mark Lemley, Anup
Malani, Tom Nachbar, Bob Scott, Tim Wu, and workshop participants at the University of
California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), Chicago-Kent College of Law, Columbia
Law School, UCLA School of Law, and the University of Virginia School of Law for helpful
discussion of some of the issues in this Article. Special thanks to Shannon Lang, James
Tysse, and Joseph Zihal for excellent research assistance.
1. See Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 Iowa L. Rev.
731, 732 (2003) ("Courts and scholars have spilled a great deal of ink on the subject of
trademark dilution.").
2. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 684
(2004).
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erful,"3 and "immensely popular."4 Commentators have labeled dilution
law "a fundamental shift in the nature of trademark protection,"5 con-
cluded that "plaintiffs frequently win" their dilution claims,6 and won-
dered whether the statute will prove to be a "disaster."7 Some commenta-
tors are concerned that dilution law represents an expansion in property
rights at the expense of the public domain.8 Others worry that it stifles
expression, hampers commercial communication, or reduces competi-
tion.9 Richard Posner frets about dilution's "seductive appeal."10
This is exactly what one would expect from reading the federal dilu-
tion statute. On its face, dilution law looks like a powerful form of protec-
tion, one that should be easy to enforce. 1 The Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act (FTDA) protects "[tihe owner of a famous mark . . . against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution
of the distinctive quality of the mark."' 2 Prior to the advent of this form
of protection, the owner of a mark could recover for trademark infringe-
ment under the Lanham Act only if the commercial use of its mark by
someone else caused consumer confusion. 13 By contrast, dilution grants
trademark holders a remedy for the use of their famous marks by another
3. Gerard N. Magliocca, From Ashes to Fire: Trademark and Copyright in Transition,
82 N.C. L. Rev. 1009, 1033 (2004) (stating that dilution "is now a powerful alternative to
the traditional model of trademark protection").
4. David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New
Millennium, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1659, 1681 (2004).
5. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
Yale L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999).
6. David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of
the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 Hastings L.J. 117, 118
(2004) ("[Pllaintiffs frequently win such cases when proof of dilutive harm is remote and
highly speculative, at best. .. ").
7. Wendy J. Gordon, Introduction, Symposium, Ralph Sharp Brown, Intellectual
Property, and the Public Interest, 108 Yale L.J. 1611, 1614-15 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1295, 1305 n.29 (1998)
("Modern trademark law is moving ... towards a . . . property rights regime.").
9. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 7, at 1614-15 (expressing concern about dilution
law's ability to undermine comparative advertising and parody); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 900 (1997) (reviewingJames
Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information
Society (1996)) (stating that trademark owners "are well on their way to owning the
exclusive right to pun").
10. Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 621, 623 (2003).
11. See Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign
Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L.
415, 416-17 (1998) ("[A] suit for dilution is easier to prove than infringement because the
troublesome factual question of consumer confusion is not relevant.").
12. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (2000).
13. See Lanham Act §§ 32(1), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (establishing
liability for infringement of registered and unregistered marks, respectively).
1030
DILUTION
even when consumers are not confused. 14 Firms can now find themselves
in the cross hairs of a trademark owner with whom they do not even com-
pete.1 5 One example sometimes offered to illustrate a potential dilution
claim is the simultaneous use of the trademark TIFFANY' 6 by a jewelry
store and a restaurant.'
7
The dilution statute may well look fearsome in print, but what is it
like in reality? This Article explores how dilution law is actually being
judicially enforced. To do so, it examines the enforcement rates of dilu-
tion claims in reported cases and in unreported trademark filings. These
data also include the results for unreported settled cases in which dilu-
tion was asserted as a claim. If it is really true that dilution law is a power-
ful form of protection in practice, then we should expect to see robust
judicial enforcement of dilution claims brought by trademark holders
against a range of competitors and noncompetitors alike.
The data show that dilution has not been as powerful a theory of
infringement as one might expect. Judicial enforcement of dilution law
is not robust today and has been eroding over time. In the first year of
federal dilution law's existence, the judiciary accepted dilution claims ap-
proximately half the time in my sample.18 But relief rates have been on a
downward trajectory since then.19 It could well be the case that dilution
law is a powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist letters and in negoti-
ations entirely outside the litigatory arena. In the federal courts, how-
ever, dilution cases are not exactly a juggernaut. That is not to say that
dilution law lacks seductive appeal, but rather that it seems not to have
worked its wiles on the judicial mind as many feared.
The weakness of dilution law in practice may come as a surprise. It is
not the result one would expect from reading the statute itself, from
knowing which litigants benefit from dilution law's robust enforcement,
or from examining other areas of intellectual property. In other areas of
intellectual property, the trend has been toward stronger, broader, and
longer protection. 20 Over time, the various areas of intellectual property
law have expanded to encompass more subject matter in their respective
14. Id. § 1127 (stating that dilution may occur "regardless of the presence or absence
of... likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception").
15. Id. (asserting that dilution may occur in "absence of... competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties").
16. 1 follow the convention of indicating a word or logo used as a trademark by
displaying it in all capital letters.
17. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing example
of different uses of TIFFANY).
18. See infra Tables I & 2.
19. See infra Tables 1 & 2.
20. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (A)
(2000) (prohibiting "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls
access" to copyrighted work).
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ambits. 2 1 Congress has lengthened the terms of protection for patent
and copyright law. 22 In recent decades, legal enforcement of intellectual
property rights has become easier and more favorable. 23 One would ex-
pect trademark dilution law to be no different. And yet in the federal
courts, at least, dilution appears to be notjust holding out against expan-
sion, but weakening.
There could be any number of reasons for the falling rates of en-
forcement of dilution claims. This Article explores judicial disenchant-
ment with dilution law as one such reason. Quantitative and qualitative
data derived from published opinions and from general trademark in-
fringement filings indicate that after a period of initial broad interpreta-
tion and sometimes even enthusiastic embrace of dilution law, courts in
recent years have become rather chary of it. Courts have thrown up barri-
ers to the success of dilution claims, even to the point of imposing limita-
tions not in the statute.24 Although judges have generally not articulated
clearly or consistently why they are uncomfortable with dilution, certain
broad themes underlie their discomfort.
Courts appear to recognize that dilution law has a place-albeit a
carefully circumscribed place-among the various forms of intellectual
property protection. The FTDA encompasses a broad range of third-
party (nonowner) uses of a trademark. 2 5 Distinguishing between social
welfare-enhancing uses and social welfare-reducing uses is key, but the
statute by itself provides little guidance. Judges have instinctively, al-
though not explicitly, recognized that many dilution claims reduce social
welfare even when they appear to fall within the parameters of the stat-
ute.26 Courts then find reasons to deny relief in individual cases whose
21. See, e.g., Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act § 704, 17 U.S.C. § 120
(providing copyright protection for architectural works); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (allowing color to qualify for trademark protection); State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding business methods patentable); see also Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806,
811-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing grant of summary judgment denying right of publicity
claim in fictional characters).
22. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (amended 2002)) (extending term of
copyright protection by twenty years); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, § 532(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4983-84 (1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000)
(amended 2002)) (changing patent term from seventeen years from time of issue to twenty
years from time of filing).
23. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev.
1575, 1665 (2004) ("[Tlhe assumption that a finding of patent infringement will be
accompanied by an injunction is almost universal.").
24. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45-50 (1st Cir. 1998)
(denying protection against dilution to product shape).
25. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)
(2000) (allowing injunction "against another person's commercial use [of a famous mark]
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution").
26. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95-96 (2d Cir.
2001) (denying dilution protection to descriptive mark).
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facts only hint at larger problems with dilution law. Over the years, vari-
ous circuits have developed their own ways to shut down many of the
dilution claims that come before them, which has resulted in dilution law
evolving quickly and differently from circuit to circuit. 27
Trademark holders have not completely adjusted their pleading
practices to reflect these changes in the law. Plaintiffs almost always
plead dilution as one of a number of claims, and most plaintiffs are prob-
ably not basing their expectations of success in the lawsuit solely or even
largely on their dilution claim. Instead, they most likely are calculating
their chances of success on other grounds, such as traditional trademark
infringement or unfair competition claims. The marginal cost to plain-
tiffs of pleading dilution as an additional claim in a trademark infringe-
ment suit is low. Bringing a dilution claim can raise defendants' antici-
pated costs, which can increase a plaintiffs leverage in the suit and help
speed settlements. Even as courts have become less willing to enforce
dilution claims over time, the costs to most plaintiffs of pleading dilution
remain small and the benefits positive.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses dilution as a theory
of infringement. Part II presents the results I obtained from examining
reported dilution cases and unreported filings. This Part shows that judi-
cial enforcement of dilution claims has been dropping over time, and
explores some reasons why this might be so and why trademark holders
have not fully responded to these developments. Part III expands upon
judicial dissatisfaction with dilution law. Courts are uncomfortable with
the reach of dilution law and are progressively reading limitations into
the statute in response. Although judges are not justifying their actions
in efficiency terms, over time they are generally denying enforcement in
cases where enjoining unauthorized use of the trademark would reduce
social welfare.
I. DILUTION AS A THEORY OF INFRINGEMENT
Trademark law, at least in its classical form, is directed at preventing
harm to consumers through the misleading or confusing use of trade-
marks. Trademarks indicate the source or origin of goods.28 Because
many things can serve as source identifiers, trademarks are not confined
to words, phrases, pictures, logos, symbols, and other merely literary ele-
ments. The look and feel of a product, a product configuration, a color,
27. Compare Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999) ("It is
quite clear that the statute intends distinctiveness, in addition to fame, as an essential
element."), with Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157,
166-67 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are not persuaded that a mark be subject to separate tests
for fame and distinctiveness.").
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish [a person's] goods").
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sound, or scent may serve as a source identifier.29 Thus, this Article will
refer to all product identifiers protected under the Lanham Act as
"marks" and "trademarks," even though some of these may actually be
trade dress or service marks.
Classical trademark law is based on the proposition that consumers
rely on a particular mark to identify a product possessing a particular mix
of attributes. 30 On this view, a trademark is a proxy for a set of product
attributes. Use of an identical or similar mark on a different product with
a different set of product characteristics can increase consumers' infor-
mation costs about the good and may cause confusion. Consumers may
be confused about the source of the goods, they may mistakenly believe
an entity has sponsored or approved a product, or they may merely be
observers (not direct purchasers) of the good after it has been purchased.
But regardless of what form the actual or potential confusion takes, classi-
cal trademark law allows trademark holders to recover only to the extent
reasonable consumers are actually or likely to be confused. 31 With this
focus on consumers, the classical trademark entitlement is essentially a
set of use rights rather than purely exclusionary rights: A trademark
holder's ability to recover is determined by the way the mark is used by
others. What constitutes a prohibited third-party use is a context-depen-
dent question. Outcomes will be influenced by such factors as the nature
of the product (e.g., an inspection good vs. an experience good), 32
whether the owners and users are competing in the same product mar-
ket, the nature and knowledge of the relevant consumer audience (such
as whether they are children or particularly savvy consumers), and the
manner in which the mark is used.
By contrast, dilution law is producer-focused rather than consumer-
focused: It seeks to prevent diminution in the value of a famous mark
stemming from the use of the mark by someone other than the trade-
mark holder. 33 Dilution law's underlying assumption is that the unautho-
rized use of a famous mark by third parties, even when consumers are not
confused by the use of the mark, can diminish the mark's selling power
29. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (including
color within the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark"); Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992) (finding restaurant decor to be protected
trade dress); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (scent); In re
Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (sound).
30. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law 166-72 (2003) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economic
Structure].
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a) (1) (A) (granting relief for third-party use
that "is likely to cause confusion").
32. See infra text accompanying notes 102-103 for a description of inspection goods
and experience goods.
33. What this Article (and the literature) customarily refers to as "dilution law" is
technically antidilution law.
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and value because the mark is no longer associated with a single source. 34
Congress put a distinctly producer-oriented spin on dilution when it spec-
ified that "dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has
made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself,
protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their
own gain."35 The Supreme Court has recognized Congress's concerns,
stating that "[u]nlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions
against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law develop-
ment, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers."36
Perhaps it is because a dilution theory of trademark protection is a depar-
ture from trademark law's traditional goals that Congress allowed recov-
ery in the absence of consumer confusion. 3 7
Some commentators have argued that dilution law is geared toward
protecting consumers because diminution of a famous mark's ability to
identify a product increases consumers' search costs. 3 8 Recent cases can
support this contention, as courts have steered dilution law away from its
producer-oriented roots toward a greater focus on the consumer, but the
legislative history of the FTDA suggests that Congress originally had more
producer-centered considerations in mind.3 9 Congress had instrumental-
ist aims as well. The House Report asserts that passage of the FTDA
would "assist the executive branch in its bilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions with other countries" on intellectual property issues and would help
maintain "the United States' position as a leader setting the standards for
strong worldwide protection of intellectual property."40
On its face, dilution law looks like a relatively strong form of trade-
mark protection. Dilution is a more exclusionary version of the trade-
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution as "lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of- (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception").
35. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
36. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
37. Because there is more than one theory of what dilution is, courts are divided on
the relationship between consumer confusion and dilution. Compare Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Consumer confusion would undoubtedly
dilute the distinctive selling power of a trademark."), and Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger,
14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that presence of confusion is relevant to
showing dilution), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002)
("Dilution works its harm not by causing confusion in consumers' minds regarding the
source of a good or service, but by creating an association in consumers' minds between a
mark and a different good or service.").
38. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emory L.J. 461, 493 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley,
Merchandising Right] ("[P]roperly understood, dilution is targeted at reducing consumer
search costs, just as traditional trademark law is.").
39. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 ("The concept of dilution recognizes the
substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura
of the mark itself ....
40. Id. at 4.
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mark entitlement than the classic likelihood-of-confusion variant. If we
arrayed all the possible variations of the propertarian forms of protection
along a spectrum ranging from nuanced and contingent use-based forms
at one end to Blackstonian-style exclusionary forms at the other, dilution
would be closer to the exclusionary end than would the classic likelihood-
of-confusion variant. 41 Dilution law creates relatively stronger duties of
avoidance of protected marks, whereas classic trademark infringement
creates weaker duties of avoidance that are more nuanced and context-
contingent. If classic trademark infringement can be analogized to the
law of nuisance in real property, dilution has more trespass-like elements.
For famous marks at least, one would expect dilution to be the more
powerful theory of trademark protection.
At a broad enough level of abstraction, dilution hangs together. But
it begins to dissolve as a concept the closer one gets to it. One of the
difficulties posed by dilution law is ambiguity about the nature of the
harm that arises from diluting a mark. Indeed, dilution is a concept
whose harm has been called "dauntingly elusive." 42 Because the harm
that dilution law seeks to prevent is difficult to define, there is no single
accepted definition of dilution.43 Courts are defining dilution in several
different ways, two of which-blurring and tarnishment-are interpreta-
tions imported from more than sixty years of state dilution law.44 Blur-
ring is the use of a mark by a third party to identify a different product in
a way that weakens the connection in consumers' minds between the
mark and the original product, although it does not go so far as to create
41. Dilution is not composed purely of bright-line rules-no entitlement is-which is
why I place it relatively closer to the exclusionary end of the spectrum protection. See
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993) (discussing
exclusionary "Blackstonian" bundle of rights); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent
and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 517-22 (2004) (discussing exclusionary rules in
intellectual property). Frank Schechter, who initiated the concept of dilution, envisioned
a narrower form of the entitlement. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 828-31 (1927) (proposing form of dilution
law limited to conflicts between identical marks, where plaintiff's mark was not only
famous but also arbitrary and where defendant's use of mark was on noncompeting and
nonsimilar goods).
42. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999). Commentators generally agree. See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger,
Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection,
58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 789, 840-41 (1997) (discussing dilution's "elusive harm"); David S.
Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 531, 543 (1991) (arguing
that dilution theory fails to explain why trademark holder suffers harm).
43. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003)
(mentioning blurring and tarnishment as theories of dilution).
44. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating
that dilution "encompasses traditional state law doctrines of blurring and tarnishment"),
aft'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998).
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outright confusion. 45 Tarnishment is the use of a trademark by a third
party in a way that creates a negative impression of the trademark in the
minds of consumers.46 The existence of multiple variations of dilution
indicates that dilution's harm can be hard to identify.
The harm of dilution is also elusive because it is not clear from the
face of the statute whom the law is trying to protect. Although the legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress's main intent was to protect trade-
mark holders rather than consumers-an intent the Supreme Court has
recognized 4 7-this intent was not clearly incorporated into the FTDA.
The fact that dilution's harm is ill-defined is contributing to the increas-
ing wariness of courts to grant relief. Part II of this Article shows that
relief for dilution claims has become harder to obtain. Part III discusses
some of the reasons why this may be the case.
II. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
I started by testing how often dilution claims were successful. Specifi-
cally, I wanted to test how often trademark holders succeeded in getting
injunctive relief for the alleged dilution of their trademarks by others.
Because an injunction is the only available remedy for a dilution claim
and because the grant of an injunction is more readily verifiable and less
variable than the assessment of damages, 48 examining the presence and
rate of injunctive relief is a replicable and objective data point to mea-
sure. I confined my inquiry to federal cases because I am interested in
testing relief solely under federal dilution law for this Article. Although a
majority of the states have dilution statutes of their own-most of which
were adopted long before passage of the FTDA) 49-there are significant
45. See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 24:94, at 24-208 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter McCarthy, Unfair Competition] (defining
blurring).
46. Id. § 24:95, at 24-214 (defining tarnishment).
47. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 ("[P]rohibitions against trademark dilution ... are not
motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000) (stating that "the owner of the famous mark
shall be entitled only to injunctive relief' unless the accused infringer acted willfully).
49. Thirty-five states have enacted statutes aimed at preventing dilution and two states
have adopted dilution as part of their common law. The states that have codified
antidilution law are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 4 McCarthy, Unfair Competition,
supra note 45, § 24:80, at 24-149. Michigan and Ohio have recognized dilution as part of
their common law. See Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("Dilution claims ... are cognizable under Ohio's common law."); 0 M Scott &
Sons Co. v. Surowitz, 209 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (issuing injunction on basis of
dilution claims brought in conjunction with likelihood of confusion claims).
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differences between state and federal dilution law, 50 as well as considera-
ble variation in dilution law among the states. 51 As a result, one should
be cautious about attempting to extrapolate results based on federal dilu-
tion data to the state level. I make no such attempt in this Article.
In this Part, I examine federal dilution cases. My data sets cover both
reported decisions and trademark filings generally. In subpart A, I ex-
amine reported cases and show that judicial enforcement has decreased
over time. In subpart B, I expand my data set to include unreported
dilution filings for comparison with reported results. I show that the re-
ported results are similar to the results in unreported filings. In subpart
C, I explore some of the reasons that can help explain the general trends
derived from these data sets and why trademark holders have not fully
compensated for these trends.
A. Reported Cases
To examine the rates of enforcement of dilution claims, I first com-
piled all reported opinions in the ALLFEDS database in Westlaw involv-
ing trademark dilution that had been brought in federal district and cir-
cuit courts from January 16, 1996 to July 16, 2005.52 From each year's
search results, I eliminated all opinions in which dilution was merely dis-
cussed but not explicitly asserted as a claim and all cases in which dilution
claims were brought purely under state law. I also eliminated instances of
double counting in order to make cases, rather than opinions, the unit of
measurement. Next, I excluded cases brought pursuant to the Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)5 3 that solely alleged trade-
mark dilution through the mark's use as part of an internet domain
name. Put another way, for my first set of tests, I excluded from the sam-
ple cybersquatting cases brought pursuant to the ACPA but not allega-
tions of cybersquatting brought pursuant to the FFDA. For my second set
50. One of the major differences between state and federal dilution law is that some
states do not require that a mark be famous to qualify for protection against dilution under
state law. See, e.g., Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 381 (Or. 1983)
(holding that marks distinctive only in local geographic area could be protected).
51. Some states refuse to allow trademark holders to sue competitors for dilution of a
mark; other states permit suits between competitors. Compare Soloflex Inc. v. Nordictrack
Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1731 (D. Or. 1994) (concluding that competitors may not
sue for dilution under Oregon law), with Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon
B. Johnson Improvement Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799, 811 n.6 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that
competitor may sue for dilution under Texas law).
52. Congress passed the FIDA in December 1995. President Clinton signed it into
law on January 16, 1996. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109
Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127). The search query I used for
January 16, 1996 through December 31, 1996 was: (DILUT! ANTIDILUT! ANTI-DILUT!
"1125(C)-) & (TRADEMARK "LANHAM ACT") & DA(AFTER 1/15/1996 & BEF 1/1/
1997). I repeated this search, with the appropriate date restrictions, for each of the years
1997 through 2004, and for January 1, 2005 to July 16, 2005. I ran searches by year so as
not to exceed the maximum number of cases that can be retrieved at one time.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
1038 [Vol. 106:1029
of tests, I further excluded cases involving a domain name to eliminate
any cybersquatting-type claim.
Cybersquatting cases often involve a person registering a domain
name containing a trademark in the hope of reselling the domain name
to the trademark holder. An example is a person not associated with the
Panavision corporation registering the domain name "panavision.com. ''54
Because PANAVISION would most likely be declared a famous trademark
and because the individual is using the trademark PANAVISION in a do-
main name without Panavision's permission, Panavision can bring a
trademark dilution claim. Alleged cases of cybersquatting, however, can
ultimately involve defendants being found to be using the mark legiti-
mately in a domain name, such as if Farmer McDonald registered the
domain name "mcdonalds.com," or if a person protesting the Walt Dis-
ney Corporation's support for strong copyright protection registered "dis-
ney-sucks.com." 55
Alleged dilution of trademark domain names can be challenged
under both the ACPA and the FTDA. I excluded from the sample cyber-
squatting cases brought pursuant to the ACPA for several reasons. First,
the legal requirements for dilution under the ACPA are significantly dif-
ferent from those under the FTDA.56 Second, most ACPA dilution dis-
putes are resolved by a specially created arbitration system, so the ACPA
cases that do get litigated cannot be assumed to be representative either
of all ACPA cases or of dilution cases generally. The Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has established a Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) that creates a spe-
cial arbitration system for resolving ownership of, and thereby trademark
disputes over, internet domain names. 57 A large number of disputes in-
volving the unauthorized use of a trademark in a domain name are set-
tled through ICANN's approved arbitrators.5 8 Arbitration of domain
54. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
registration of domain name "panavision.com" by individual not connected with
Panavision corporation to be cybersquatting). Mr. Toeppen demanded $13,000 from
Panavision in exchange for transfer of the domain name. Id. at 1319.
55. See http://disney-sucks.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). Lest anyone miss the
point, the site prominently states: "This web-site [sic] has no affiliation with the Walt
Disney Company." Id.
56. Among other things, the ACPA requires bad faith whereas the FTDA does not.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring "a bad faith intent to profit").
57. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last updated May 17, 2002) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (setting forth UDRP).
58. ICANN has approved the following providers to conduct dispute resolution
proceedings: Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre, CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution, The National Arbitration Forum, and the World Intellectual Property
Organization. See ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last
updated Mar. 1, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The National Arbitration
Forum (NAF), which handles the bulk of the arbitrated disputes involving domain names
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names is generally cheaper and faster than litigation in federal district
court.59 Plaintiffs who choose federal district court over arbitration are
choosing the slower and more expensive route. They also are choosing
the statistically less favorable option because trademark holders are more
likely to prevail in arbitration than in litigation. 60
Given that arbitration is cheaper, faster, and more favorable to plain-
tiffs, an interesting question is why trademark holders ever litigate over
domain names in federal court, either under the ACPA or under the
FTDA. One reason trademark holders sometimes prefer litigation to ar-
bitration may have to do with the nature of the remedy. Courts can en-
join defendants and can enforce their judgments more easily. And al-
though the UDRP vests ICANN's approved arbitrators with the authority
to transfer the ownership of domain names from one party to another,
when a respondent engages in a consistent practice of registering and
then selling domain names containing others' trademarks, arbitrators
may not be able to provide effective relief.
1. Federal Courts. - Having compiled a set of reported cases in which
dilution was pled under the FTDA, I started with the simplest of inquiries:
How often are trademark holders getting relief on their dilution claims
and how are these results distributed over time? Since an injunction is
the only available relief for a dilution claim, 6 1 I defined relief as instances
in which the trademark holder walked away with injunctive relief that
in North America, resolved 5,321 disputes under the UDRP in the six years between
December 23, 1999 (the day the NAF started accepting disputes) and December 23, 2005.
See NAF, Domain Dispute Proceedings and Decisions, at http://www.arbforum.com/
domains/decisions.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) (search results on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Many of these involved trademark disputes over multiple domain names.
See, e.g., Cable News Network v. Khouri, Claim No. FA0208000117876 (N.A.F. Dec. 16,
2002), at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/117876.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (transferring 325 domain names containing trademark "CNN").
59. Litigation costs for the median trademark infringement cases brought in federal
court are estimated at $298,000 when less than one million dollars was at risk, at $602,000
when one million to twenty-five million dollars was at risk, and at $1,006,000 when more
than twenty-five million dollars was at risk. See Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Report of
the Economic Survey 2003, at 94-95 tbl.22 (reporting estimated costs of litigation). By
contrast, NAF's fees run from $400 for claims less than twenty-five hundred dolldrs to
$10,000 for claims from one to five million dollars. See NAF, Fee Schedule (Jan. 1, 2005),
at http://www.arbforum.com/programs/codenew/2005_fees.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
60. The NAF transferred domain names to complainants 74.65% of the time, or in
3,972 out of 5,321 disputes brought between December 23, 1999, when the NAF started
accepting disputes, and December 23, 2005. See NAF, Domain Dispute Proceedings and
Decisions, at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions.asp (last visited Mar. 24,
2006) (search results on file with the Columbia Law Review) (deriving calculation from
database of decisions); see also ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (May 10, 2004), at http://www.icann.
org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing UDRP
statistics).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) ("The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled... to
an injunction.").
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stuck. This includes instances in which the trademark holder was granted
summary judgment on its dilution claim, or the trademark holder was
granted a preliminary injunction on its dilution claim and the parties set-
tled before trial,6 2 or the trademark holder received permanent relief af-
ter trial. If the district court granted a preliminary injunction and then
failed to give permanent relief on dilution claims in cases that went to
trial, I did not count this as a favorable outcome for the trademark holder
on the dilution claim.
Confining the measure of success on dilution claims to instances of
judicial enforcement is arguably a narrow definition of success. In partic-
ular, it excludes instances in which the trademark holder was not able to
get a preliminary injunction and the case terminated before trial. Such a
result, although not a success in getting injunctive relief, may not be a
failure for the trademark holder either. If the case was terminated in the
absence of an injunction because the trademark holder dropped it, then
the result is likely not a favorable one for the trademark holder. But if
the case was terminated because the parties settled in the absence of an
injunction, one could treat the settlement as a half-success (at least) for
the trademark holder. Half-successes from settlements in cases that ter-
minate in the absence of a preliminary injunction are not measured in
my results; instead they are counted as failures. Parties' private satisfac-
tion with settlement results, moreover, is a variable that could not reliably
be observed or measured.
My sample contained 344 reported cases from January 16, 1996 to
July 16, 2005. I counted each case in the year in which relief was granted
or denied. In most of these cases, dilution was asserted as one of several
claims. I eliminated from my sample any cases in which injunctive relief
had been granted but for which it was not possible to determine whether
relief had been granted on dilution or on some other claim. 63 There
were a small number of such cases in the sample.64 Although excluding
unclear cases of relief pushes down the apparent rate of injunctive relief
on dilution claims in my sample, there were sufficiently few such cases-
11 out of 344, or 3.20%-that excluding them did not noticeably change
the overall distribution of results. Relief was granted in 106 of the 344
cases, or 30.81% of the time.
For each year's cohort of cases, I measured the rate at which trade-
mark holders were able to obtain relief on any claim other than an FTDA
62. See, e.g., Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Scis. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1995, 1999-2000 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
63. See, e.g., Te-Ta-Ma Truth Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the
Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2002). In this opinion, Judge Easterbrook reversed a
denial of relief for the plaintiff on its trademark claims, of which dilution was one, and
remanded with instructions to enter relief for plaintiff, but did not specify whether this was
because the mark was diluted. Id.
64. Unclear cases were distributed as follows: None in 1996; none in 1997; two in
1998; one in 1999; two in 2000; one in 2001; one in 2002; one in 2003; two in 2004; one in
2005.
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dilution claim. Thus, if a trademark holder asserted four claims-for ex-
ample, one brought under the FTDA and the remaining three brought
on some other basis-and received relief on one of the non-FITDA claims,
this result was included in the calculation of nondilution rates of relief.
Similarly, if a trademark holder was granted relief on an FTDA claim as
well as on a nondilution claim, this result was included both in the calcu-
lation of dilution relief and in nondilution relief. Trademark holders
were able to obtain a remedy on a nondilution ground in 165 out of 344
of the cases in the sample, or 47.97% of the time.
Because trademark holders may be granted relief on dilution and
nondilution claims in the same case, the rate of relief on any-ground will
usually be less than the sum of rates of relief on dilution and on nondilu-
tion grounds. Trademark holders were able to able to obtain some form
of relief in 179 out of 344 cases, or 52.03% of the time. Table 1 shows the
distribution, by year, of relief on FTDA grounds, on nondilution grounds,
and on any ground.
TABLE 1: RELIEF IN REPORTED FTDA CASES
Rate of
Rate of Relief relief on
Number Relief relief Rate of granted on any ground
of granted on Relief relief on any ground (%)
reported on a dilution granted on nondilution (dilution (dilution
dilution dilution claim nondilution grounds and and
Year cases claim (%) grounds (%) nondilution) nondilution)
January 1, 25 3 12.00 5 20.00 6 24.00
2005-July
16, 2005
2004 41 7 17.07 21 51.22 21 51.22
2003 35 6 17.14 14 40.00 14 40.00
2002 38 10 26.32 16 42.11 16 42.11
2001 31 9 29.03 10 32,26 13 41.94
2000 43 14 32.56 23 53.49 23 53.49
1999 49 14 28.57 20 40,82 24 48.98
1998 48 21 43.75 31 64,58 31 64.58
1997 35 12 34.29 17 48.57 19 54.29
January 24 13 54.17 13 54.17 18 75.00
16, 1996-
December
31, 1996
Total 344 106 30.81 165 47.97 179 52.03
The results show that the rate at which trademark holders have been
able to get injunctive relief on their dilution claims in district court has
been dropping over time from an initial success rate of 54.17% in 1996 to
12.00% for the first half of 2005. Rates of relief on nondilution grounds
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displayed greater fluctuation from year to year, but were higher than
rates of relief on dilution grounds, in every year after 1996. Relief on
nondilution grounds also dropped over time. The results from Table 1
are represented graphically in Figure 1. The linear trendlines of Figure 1
show that the rate of relief on dilution claims, the rate of relief on
nondilution claims, and the overall relief rate have all decreased between
1996 and 2005. As can be seen from the slope of the trendline, the de-
crease in rates of relief on dilution claims is greater than the decrease in
the rates of relief on nondilution grounds.
All but one of the results in 2003 occurred after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Moseley v. VSecret Catalogue, Inc.65 By holding
that trademark holders must prove actual harm rather than a likelihood
of harm, Moseley made it more difficult for trademark holders to prevail.66
Moseley contributes to the decrease in trademark holders' success on dilu-
tion claims and continues the trend in which relief on dilution claims
became harder to obtain.
FIGURE 1: RELIEF IN REPORTED FTDA CASES
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S30
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1996-Dec. 2005-July
31,1996 16,2005Year
Rate of relief on dilution claims
Rate of relief on nondilution claims
Overall relief rate
65. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
66. See id. at 432-33. Moseley was handed down on March 4, 2003. The case in my
cohort of 2003 cases that was decided before Moseley was handed down is Christopher D.
Smithers Found., Inc. v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., No. 1:00CV05502, 2003 WL
115234 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2003).
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Next, I wanted to test the degree to which the presence of domain
names influenced the results. Recall that I excluded cases in which dilu-
tion was pleaded under the ACPA, but initially retained cases brought
pursuant to the FTDA involving domain names. 67 From 1996 to 1999,
the only statute under which a trademark owner could bring a cyber-
squatting claim was the FTDA. The ACPA, which was passed in 1999, was
tailor-made for cybersquatting claims, as its name suggests. 68 After Con-
gress passed the ACPA in 1999, the FTDA became a less popular ground
on which to bring cybersquatting claims involving the dilution of a
mark.69 As a result, we would expect my sample to contain more cyber-
squatting cases from 1996 to 1999 than from 1999 onwards. Ifjudges find
cybersquatting to be a particularly compelling reason for granting injunc-
tive relief under dilution law, as some commentators have argued, then
all else equal we would expect the rate of relief on dilution claims to drop
starting in 1999.70
To test the accuracy of this expectation, I removed cases involving a
domain name from my sample. When cases involving a domain name are
excluded, the sample size of reported cases drops to 290. Relief on dilu-
tion grounds was granted in 87 of these 290 cases, or 30.00% of the time.
Trademark holders were able to obtain a remedy on a nondilution
ground in 141 out of 290 of the cases in the sample, or 48.62% of the
time. Finally, trademark holders were able to obtain relief on any ground
in 151 out of 290 cases, or 52.07% of the time. Table 2 shows these re-
sults for each year in the time period I examined.
67. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
68. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)
(2000)).
69. See Franklyn, supra note 6, at 138 n.133 ("Prior to the adoption of the [ACPA] in
1999, plaintiffs' claims were usually funneled into the dilution mold [of the FTDA].").
70. See, e.g., id. ("Judges did not like cybersquatting. They clearly thought it a form
of free-riding that should be stopped. They therefore found little difficulty in stretching
standard dilution law to achieve that end."); J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark
Has Been Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 713, 724 (2004) (stating that "the
early use of the antidilution act as a weapon against cybersquatters" contributed to the
"acceptance of assumptions of injury without proof").
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TABLE 2: RELIEF IN REPORTED FTDA CASES, EXCLUDING DOMAIN NAMES
Rate of
Rate of Relief relief on
Number Relief relief Rate of granted on any ground
of granted on Relief relief on any ground (%)
reported on a dilution granted on nondilution (dilution (dilution
dilution dilution claim nondilution grounds and and
Year cases claim (%) grounds (%) nondilution) nondilution)
January 1, 21 2 9.52 5 23.81 65 23.81
2005-July
16, 2005
2004 39 6 15.38 20 51.28 20 51.28
2003 31 4 12.90 11 35.48 11 35.48
2002 35 9 25.71 14 40.00 14 40.00
2001 19 6 31.58 6 31.58 8 42.11
2000 30 8 26.67 16 53.33 18 60.00
1999 44 12 27.27 19 43.18 22 50.00
1998 42 17 40.48 28 66.67 28 66.67
1997 29 15 51.72 14 40.48 15 51.72
January 21 10 47.62 13 61.90 15 71.43
16, 1996-
December
31, 1996
Total 290 87 30.00 141 48.62 151 52.07
When domain name cases were excluded, the rate of injunctive relief
for dilution cases in the sample drops from 47.62% in 1996 to 9.52% for
the first half of 2005. The results show that injunctive relief has become
harder to obtain over time even when domain name cases are completely
removed from the sample. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the
drop in enforcement rates was driven entirely by parties bringing fewer
domain name cases under the FTDA after 1999.
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FIGURE 2: RELIEF IN REPORTED FTDA CASES, EXCLUDING DOMAIN NAMES
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Figure 3 directly compares rates of relief in the set of cases contain-
ing domain names with the rate of relief in the set of cases from which
domain names have been removed.
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FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF RELIEF RATES FOR DILUTION CLAIMS IN
SAMPLES INCLUDING AND EXCLUDING DOMAIN NAMES
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2. State Courts. - Because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over claims brought under the Lanham Act, 71 I next searched for re-
ported cases containing a dilution claim brought in state court under the
Lanham Act since the passage of the FTDA. Once again, I eliminated all
cases in which dilution was merely discussed but not explicitly asserted as
a claim and all cases involving the use of the trademark in a domain
name. There were no reported cases left after I imposed these parame-
ters. This suggests that state courts are not playing a significant role in
the enforcement of federal dilution claims or in the development of fed-
eral dilution law.
B. Filings
The cases I examined for the preceding results were reported deci-
sions. Reported decisions are issued in only a fraction of all the cases
brought. Although a survey of reported cases can produce a rough assess-
ment of the kinds of results actually being obtained in dilution trials, we
cannot necessarily assume that it is representative of the total number of
71. See Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 84 F.3d 1388, 1394 (11th
Cir. 1996) (holding states share concurrent jurisdiction for Lanham Act claims); see also 5
McCarthy, Unfair Competition, supra note 45, at § 32:1 (explaining concurrent
jurisdiction under Lanham Act).
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dilution cases brought without also examining unreported filings.7 2 I
next set out to compare the reported cases with the results obtained from
unreported dilution filings.
1. Total Trademark Filings. - My first step was to examine public
records available from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (AO) to determine the total number of cases labeled as trademark
cases for each year from 1996 to 2005, 7 3 The AO compiles statistics on all
cases filed and terminated in the federal courts. The data can be organ-
ized by subject matter and district. In the case of trademark infringe-
ment, the AO's code is "840."7 4 Thus, "trademark infringement filings"
in this paper refers to cases coded "840" by the AO. From January 16,
1996 toJuly 16, 2005, there have been 33,488 filings labeled as trademark
infringement cases by the Administrative Office. 75
2. Dilution Filings. - To test whether my set of reported cases was
representative of dilution cases generally, I needed to compile a set of
unreported cases in which a federal dilution claim had been pled. Be-
cause an allegation of dilution is just one claim out of many that a plain-
tiff could make in a trademark infringement suit, I needed to check the
initial complaints to verify that dilution had been pled. For those filings
in which dilution was pled, I then needed to check the docket to deter-
mine if injunctive relief had been granted on the dilution claim.
Using the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
database, I identified the ten judicial districts in the United States for
which the largest number of trademark complaints were available for the
years 1996 to 2005. To do this, I selected a judicial district and entered
case type "840" and the relevant year as search parameters. The result
would indicate how many filings had been labeled "840" by the AO for
72. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 106-08
(2002).
73. AO data can be flawed both by Type I errors (coding a filing "840" when it is not a
trademark case) and Type II errors (failing to code a filing "840" when it is a trademark
case). See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1497, 1507-09 & n.34 (2003) (reporting "deficiencies in the Administrative Office
data due to a lack of reporting or inconsistent reporting"). To control for overinclusion, I
verified that each filing in my sample was truly a trademark case-and more specifically, a
trademark dilution case-by examining the plaintiffs initial complaint. I could not
control for underinclusion.
74. Although the AO defines the cases coded as "840" as "trademark" cases, they are
actually only trademark infringement cases, and do not include appeals of administrative
proceedings by the Patent and Trademark Office.
75. The breakdown of these filings by year appears in Appendix A of this Article. For
data from 1996 through 2004, see Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables for
the Federal Judiciary, vols. 1996-2004, tbl.C-4 [hereinafter U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables].
I counted the number of filings for 2005 using the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER) database. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center, at
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/index.html. For 1996, I subtracted the number of filings
from January 1 to January 15 (obtained from PACER) from the total number of trademark
filings reported by the AO for that year.
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that district in the chosen year.76 From this list, I identified the subset of
cases for which the plaintiff's initial complaint was available. Relatively
few complaints were available for cases filed before 2000. Starting in
2000, the number of filings for which a complaint was available increased
markedly. I then repeated this process for each one of the 89 districts in
the PACER database. 77 The ten districts with the greatest number of
trademark complaints available were the Northern District of California,
the Southern District of California, the Middle District of Florida, the
Northern District of Illinois, the District of Massachusetts, the Eastern
District of Michigan, the Eastern District of New York, the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio, the Northern District of Texas, and the Western District of
Washington.
For the years 1996 to 1999, I examined every initial complaint that
was available from these ten districts in order to get the largest possible
pool of dilution filings.78 For each of the years 2000 through 2005, I
examined a random sample of complaints. When selecting cases, I iden-
tified each filing by docket number to minimize bias.79 I looked to see
whether relief was granted on the dilution claim by examining the docket
for each case. As with my set of reported cases, I defined relief as includ-
ing instances in which the trademark holder was granted summary judg-
ment on the dilution claim, or was granted a preliminary injunction on
the dilution claim and the parties settled before trial, or received perma-
nent relief. If the district court granted a preliminary injunction and
then failed to give permanent relief on a dilution claim in cases that went
to trial, this did not count as a favorable outcome for the trademark
holder on the dilution claim. If the result on the dilution claim was am-
biguous, I discarded the filing from the database and drew another filing
randomly. As with my reported cases, I counted each filing in the year in
which relief was granted or denied. Data from PACER for 1996 through
1999 is considerably thinner than data after 1999, so for the years 1996
through 1999, I used every outcome for which a complaint and unambig-
uous docket were available. For the years 2000 through 2004, I used a
sample size of 100 outcomes per year. For the period January 1, 2005 to
July 16, 2005, I compiled a sample of 54 outcomes so as to keep the con-
centration of outcomes consistent with the years 2000 to 2004. Table 3
shows the results.
76. I limited the time period of each search to one year so as to avoid retrieving more
than the allowable number of filings.
77. Data were not available for the District of Alaska and the District of New Mexico.
78. Because relatively few complaints in cases filed from 1996 through 1999 were
available on PACER at the time I conducted this study, I was not able reliably to measure
how frequently dilution was pled as a percentage of all trademark filings.
79. Had I selected cases by party name, I could potentially have been biased, however
unconsciously, to choose cases with well-known party names. All else equal, parties with
well-known names are more likely to have famous trademarks, and only famous marks are
eligible for protection against dilution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (2000).
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TABLE 3: RATES OF RELIEF ON FEDERAL DILUTION CLAIMS
IN UNREPORTED FILINGS
Cases
granting Rate of Cases
relief on relief on granting Rate of relief
FTDA FTDA relief on on FrDA
Sample size claim claim (%) Sample size FrDA claim claim (%)
(including (including (including (excluding (excluding (excluding
domain domain domain domain domain domain
Year names) names) names) names) names) names)
January 1, 54 8 14.81 52 7 13.36
2005-July
16, 2005
2004 100 25 25.00 93 20 21.51
2003 100 29 29.00 88 23 26.13
2002 100 32 32.00 87 23 26.44
2001 100 39 39.00 91 32 35.16
2000 100 38 38.00 93 34 36.55
1999 66 30 45.45 51 23 45.10
1998 28 12 42.86 23 10 43.48
1997 17 7 41.18 17 7 41.18
January 21 8 38.10 20 7 35.00
16, 1996-
December
31, 1996
Total 732 242 33.06 623 188 30.18
There were 732 dilution filings in my sample from January 16, 1996
to July 16, 2005. As with my set of reported cases, dilution was asserted as
one of several claims in almost all the filings. Relief rates initially rose
from 38.10% in 1996 to 45.45% in 1999, and trended downward thereaf-
ter to 14.81% in the first half of 2005. I then removed filings involving
domain names from the sample. There were 623 filings left. Once again,
relief rates briefly rose, this time from 35.00% in 1996 to 45.10% in 1999,
ultimately dropping to 13.36% in the first half of 2005. Because a wider
range and variety of relief is available for nondilution claims, because ver-
ifying relief on nondilution claims from the available dockets was consid-
erably more difficult than verifying relief on dilution claims alone, and
because trying to find unambiguous nondilution claim results would have
greatly diminished the available sample size, the sample of unreported
filings does not include results on nondilution claims.
Figure 4 presents a comparison of the sets of unreported filings, in-
cluding and excluding domain names, with the sets of reported cases,
including and excluding domain names. The outcomes for the reported
cases and the unreported filings follow a similar pattern. In both the sets
of reported cases and the sets of unreported filings, overall injunctive
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relief rates drop over time, although the two sets of unreported filings
(i.e., those with and without domain names) briefly trend upward from
1996 to 1999. From 1999 onward, injunctions are denied with greater
frequency in the sets of reported cases than they are in the sets of filings.
FIGURE 4: RELIEF IN FEDERAL DILUTION FILINGS COMPARED WITH RELIEF
IN REPORTED CASES
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Several things may affect the composition of my sample of dilution
filings. Because one of the parameters I used was a filing date ofJanuary
16, 1996 or later, my sample does not include cases filed before January
16, 1996 whose pleadings were later amended to include a dilution claim.
This may result in an underrepresentation of dilution cases for 1996 (and
perhaps, although less so, for 1997) but is unlikely to be a problem for
years after that. Also my results do not include cases in which dilution
was asserted as a counterclaim by the defendant. This may also result in
an undercount of dilution filings. Because of the nature of dilution law
and its fame requirement, however, I do not expect that defendants will
make dilution counterclaims frequently. Finally, although my sample of
* Rate of relief in reported cases
U Rate of relief in reported cases (excluding domain names)
- - Rate of relief in unreported filings
-0 . - Rate of relief in unreported filings (excluding domain names)
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filings was numerically larger than my sample of reported cases, it was
drawn from a smaller number of districts. If plaintiffs are forum-shop-
ping for favorable districts in which to file, drawing filings only from the
ten districts in which the most trademark cases are filed may create a
sample biased in favor of trademark holders when compared with re-
ported cases.
3. Jury Trials. - I wanted to test whetherjury trial results were differ-
ent from bench trial results for dilution claims. Nationwide, 564 trade-
mark infringement cases (reported and unreported) have reached trial
from 1996-2004 inclusive.8 0 Of these, 247 cases, or 44.38%, have been
tried to ajury.8 1
Because dilution is only one theory of infringement, not all these
trademark infringement jury trials will involve dilution claims. Of the
trademark infringement cases that do result in a jury trial, the jury may
still not get to decide the dilution claim because of the nature of relieft 2
Nonetheless, there have been a small handful of dilution cases tried to a
jury since 1996. Juries reached a verdict on the dilution claim in only two
cases in my sample. The jury found dilution to have occurred in one of
these two cases. 83 This is too small a sample for juries to have a signifi-
cant effect on enforcement rates in the dilution filings I examined. It is
also too small a sample to draw any robust conclusions comparing juries'
preference for dilution claims with judges'.
C. Why the Changing Pattern of Enforcement?
The number of published dilution cases since 1996 in which relief
has been granted and upheld if appealed is smaller than one might have
expected given the wording of the statute.8 4 The number of injunctions
granted has been dropping as well.8 5 Unreported filings follow a similar
pattern.8 6 One would predict that parties would adjust their expectations
of success over time. If injunctions are becoming harder to get, then why
are parties not adjusting their expectations, albeit with a lag, to new infor-
mation and settling the weaker cases?
80. See U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables, supra note 75, at tbl.C-4.
81. See id. For jury trial results, see infra Appendix B.
82. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
955 F. Supp. 598, 603 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("[W]here only an injunction is available to remedy
dilution, the Seventh Amendment does not compel a jury trial."). As the court in Ringling
Brothers observed: "[T]he Act's pertinent language makes clear the essentially equitable
nature of the dilution claim and therefore reflects Congressional intent to commit the
dilution cause of action to a court without a jury." Id. at 600.
83. Envd. Biotech, Inc. v. Sibbitt Enters., Inc., 2:03-cv-00124-VMC-SPC (M.D. Fla. Nov.
9, 2004) (PACER) (finding for defendant); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S&M Cent. Serv.
Corp., No. 03-C-4986, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22563, at *22-*23 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2004)
(granting injunction).
84. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
85. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
86. See supra Table 3.
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1. Evolution in Case Quality. - One hypothesis could be that the easi-
est dilution cases were brought first. On this theory, there may have been
a pent-up demand for a statute that would make it easier to sue unautho-
rized users of a mark in cases where consumers were not confused about
whose trademark was whose. Perhaps the easy cases of trademark dilu-
tion were disposed of in the first few years after passage of the FTDA; now
more marginal cases are being brought. Although it is possible that most
of the strong dilution cases were brought first, such an explanation lacks
traction. Indeed, if anything, the average quality of dilution claims has
risen over time. Recall that famousness is a requirement of the statute. 87
The famousness of marks in most recent cases (2001-2005) seems less
questionable than in earlier cases (1996-1997). The few dilution cases in
which injunctive relief has been granted in recent years involve marks
that are more obviously famous in the sense of being known to a nation-
wide audience, such as GENERAL MOTORS and NIKE. 88 The dilution
claims for which injunctive relief was granted in the early years of the
statute did not always involve the kinds of marks one might expect to be
declared famous. Examples include INTERMATIC, 89 GAZETTE, 90
NAILTIQUES, 9 1 TELETECH, 9 2 WAWA, 93 and various variations on
PAPAL VISIT 1999. 9 4 Similarly, the cases brought (not just won) in the
early years involve a higher percentage of marks of marginal fame or
merely niche market fame. This remains true even when domain name
cases are eliminated from the sample. Over time the average fame of the
marks being litigated has been increasing, and the quality of cases along
this margin of measurement has been rising. Given that fewer marginal-
quality dilution cases have been brought in recent years, it appears that
trademark holders are responding to the changes in the law, even if they
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
88. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763
(E.D. Mich. 2004); Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D.
Ga. 2003).
89. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Il. 1996) (declaring
INTERMATIC famous for electrical products).
90. Gazette Newspapers v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688, 694-96 (D. Md. 1996)
(finding GAZETTE famous for local Maryland paper).
91. Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Scis. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995,
1998-99 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (declaring NAILTIQUES most likely diluted by "Pro-Techniques"
in order granting preliminary injunction).
92. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (finding TELETECH likely infringed by "teletech.com" but not by "tele-tech.
com").
93. Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1630 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
WAWA famous for convenience stores in Pennsylvania and surrounding states).
94. See Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145,
1146 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (issuing preliminary injunction forbidding defendants from using
"'Papal Visit 1999,' 'Pastoral Visit,' '1999 Papal Visit Commemorative Official
Commemorative Items,' and 'Papal Visit 1999, St. Louis' or any colorable variation
thereof"). Of the previous six cases cited in supra notes 89-94, two-TeleTech and
Intermatic-involved domain names.
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are not fully internalizing them. All else equal, one would expect to see
injunctive relief rates stabilizing over time as trademark holders adapt. If
the average quality of dilution cases (measured by the recognizability of
the mark) appears to be rising but injunction rates are still falling, per-
haps other factors are at, work.
2. Dilution as a Makeweight. - Why are trademark holders failing to
adapt fully to the falling relief rates? Parties probably are not calculating
their likelihood of success on the basis of their dilution claims. In my
samples of reported cases and unreported filings, dilution claims were
almost always brought in conjunction with other trademark claims. Most
often these were classic infringement claims: The defendant is alleged to
be using the trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusion among
consumers.9 5 Thus, one possible explanation for dilution claims still be-
ing brought despite falling relief rates is that trademark owners do not
expect dilution claims to do the heavy lifting. Most plaintiffs are likely
using classic trademark infringement claims to predict their chances of
prevailing in the suit; dilution isjust a fillip on the side. Pleading dilution
as an additional claim will present low marginal costs to the trademark
holder in most cases. Even if a dilution claim gives the trademark holder
only a small increment of leverage in forcing a settlement, that leverage
coupled with the additional costs to the defendant will often make it
worthwhile to bring even a weak dilution claim.
This is not to say that all plaintiffs are bringing dilution claims
lightly. Many trademark infringement plaintiffs do not assert dilution
claims at all. Because of the FIFDA's fame requirement, dilution simply is
not an issue for many plaintiffs. Furthermore, assertion of a dilution
claim is not completely costless. Risk averse trademark holders who ex-
pect they will be repeat players in trademark enforcement actions have
incentives not to bring marginal dilution claims. Because one of the re-
quirements for success on a dilution claim is that the mark be famous, a
trademark holder who loses a dilution claim for lack of a famous mark is
unlikely to succeed on any other dilution claim involving that mark in the
foreseeable future if that claim is marginal on the fame issue. (The con-
verse is also true: A trademark holder whose mark is declared famous in
one suit may benefit from that result in later suits if the later claim is
marginal on the fame issue.) Trademark holders who own marks with
emerging but not yet solidified fame are likely to think twice before as-
serting a dilution claim.
3. Legal Evolution. - One factor that has traction for explaining the
diminishing success rate of dilution claims in reported and unreported
cases generally is the change in dilution law over time. In the years since
dilution was added to the Lanham Act, more than just judicial enforce-
ment rates have dropped. Judicial enthusiasm for dilution as a theory of
infringement has diminished as well. In the process, interpretation of
95. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2000).
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dilution law has changed substantially. Indeed, perhaps the most noticea-
ble evolution in dilution law over time is the degree to which courts have
progressively interpreted the statute so as to make injunctive relief harder
to obtain, a development the next Part of this Article discusses.
For years, each circuit has in its own way pushed the evolution of
dilution law along. The outcome across most circuits is substantially the
same: Over time dilution claims have become harder to win. But from
1996 to 2003, the variance in interpretation across circuits over time in-
creased rather than decreased. Some order was brought to the blossom-
ing variety of interpretations of dilution law in 2003 when one of the
numerous mechanisms the various circuits had developed for reining in
many dilution claims finally worked its way up to the Supreme Court.
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. put a damper on many dilution claims by
establishing that trademark holders must prove actual harm rather than a
likelihood of harm.9 6 Nonetheless, dilution law is still evolving and varies
from circuit to circuit.
III. IMPLICATIONS
On its face, dilution appears to be a powerful form of trademark
protection, which may be one source of its fearsome reputation. But ap-
pearances belie the reality, at least as to relief in recent years. In the early
years of federal dilution law, courts often enforced the statute as written.
Over time, however, they have looked upon dilution claims with increas-
ing disfavor. Courts have not just been increasingly declining to enforce
dilution claims; they also have been busy creating statutory limitations
and erecting barriers to recovery, thereby assuring that the results will
stick. 9 7 This Part explores some of the reasons for dilution law's unpopu-
larity with the judiciary. It first considers the harm this form of trade-
mark protection is attempting to prevent and argues that the ambiguous
nature of dilution's harm is one of the reasons for thejudiciary's increas-
ing unwillingness to enforce dilution claims. Then it turns to some addi-
tional factors that underlie the judiciary's discomfort with dilution.
A. Defining Dilution's Harm
Why have judges become increasingly chary of dilution law over
time? With a few exceptions, they have not clearly articulated their rea-
sons. Often they are reduced tojustifying denial of relief with such state-
ments as, "the interests here are not the interests at the core of what
Congress intended to protect in the FTDA''98 or "we think it highly un-
likely that Congress intended to extend to [weaker] marks the expanded
96. See 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
97. For a related discussion of the possibilities of private parties acting to limit the
scope of intellectual property rights, see Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public
Domain, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 183, 184 (2004).
98. I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998).
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rights conferred by the Dilution Act."9 9 It is almost as ifjudges can sense
indirectly the existence of problems created by dilution law even if they
cannot define clearly the sources of tension. At the same time, however,
courts do recognize that dilution as a form of protection is not entirely
without benefits. Whether dilution protection results in a net increase or
decrease in social welfare in any particular case is an empirical question
and is not one this Article attempts to answer. But it does explore some
of the harms that dilution law may be attempting to address and shows
that the elusive nature of these harms is contributing to judicial disfavor
toward dilution claims.
1. Why Are Trademarks Valuable? - Assume the value of a trademark
stems from two sources. First, trademarks serve as source identifiers for
consumers and thereby reduce consumer search costs. 10 0 Classical trade-
mark theory is directed at protecting this source of trademark value. Pro-
ducers of competing goods differentiate their goods in various ways,
often by varying the attributes of the good. For example, Coke has more
orange-flavored undertones while Pepsi tends toward lemon-based notes.
Coke has a higher degree of carbonation whereas Pepsi is sweeter. 10 1
Some of the attributes of goods are readily observable; others cannot be
assessed simply by inspection of the good. On this view, the less readily
observable the product attributes, the greater the social value of trade-
marks. Because a trademark can be used by consumers as a proxy for a
set of hard-to-measure product attributes, the identification function of
trademarks is especially important for experience goods, or goods that
yield information about their qualities over time. 10 2 For example, a par-
ticular model of car is an experience good because latent defects or per-
formance advantages generally become apparent only after purchasers
have used the car for some time. By contrast, inspection goods such as
produce readily yield information about their attributes, often by casual
observation. 10 3 Trademarks are less valuable in reducing search costs for
inspection goods. Consumer benefit, and by extension social benefit, is
enhanced by making sure that when consumers rely on source identifiers,
such marks are not used in a confusing manner. The social cost is that
competitors of a trademark holder incur avoidance costs; they must cre-
ate their own nonconfusing trademark.
Second, trademarks are valuable for the goodwill they embody. This
is the source of value that dilution law attempts to protect. Consumers
come to have opinions about the products they consume or encounter
99. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
100. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of the differences between Coke and Pepsi drinks and an
example of how a consumer taste test is performed, see FrederickJ. Thumin, Identification
of Cola Beverages, 46J. Applied Psychol. 358, 358-59 (1962).
102. For a discussion of experience goods and inspection goods, see Landes &
Posner, Economic Structure, supra note 30, at 117 n.51.
103. See id.
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and by extension about the trademarks associated with these products.
These opinions can influence their future purchasing decisions about
products associated with the trademark. If the opinions are positive, the
trademark holder stands to reap the benefit, so long as it can continue to
control the way in which the mark is used. Conferring on trademark
holders the power to exclude third parties from nonconfusing uses of the
marks allows mark owners to reap the benefits of their investment in
product quality.
2. What Kind of Harm is Caused by Third-Party Use? - When it passed
the FTDA, Congress emphasized that it was trying to protect the goodwill
surrounding famous marks. 10 4 But how exactly does unauthorized (but
nonconfusing) third-party use of a mark damage the mark's goodwill?
Consider three possible types of harm that could arise from unauthorized
use of a mark.
The first type of harm, tarnishment, occurs when a third party uses
the mark to cast aspersions on the markholder. On a tarnishment theory
of harm, the goodwill surrounding a mark is diminished because consum-
ers now associate the mark with an unwholesome product (usually por-
nography or drugs). 105 On the harm side of the social welfare equation,
the relationship between unauthorized third-party use and the mark's
loss in value to the trademark holder is the strongest and most direct
under a tarnishment theory of dilution. The calculus surrounding the
benefits of tarnishing use, however, is more nuanced. Trademark hold-
ers are likely to characterize many critical or unappealing third-party uses
of their mark as tarnishing, but that does not mean that the net social
benefit of the third-party use is negative. Unauthorized nonconfusing
third-party use of a trademark for criticism, social commentary, parody,
or other speech-related purposes can have positive social benefits that
outweigh the harm to the trademark holder. Recognizing this, the ETDA
exempts comparative commercial advertising, news reporting, and news
commentary from the ambit of actionable harm. 10 6
Tarnishment is generally not a popular theory of dilution among
trademark plaintiffs. Courts have tended not to favor a tarnishment the-
ory of dilution either.' 0 7 Perhaps this is because critical or derogatory
third-party uses of a trademark often have speech implications, which can
104. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030 (stating that FDA would "create a federal cause of action to protect famous marks
from unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and established renown
of such marks").
105. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1542, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that "Buttwiser" T-shirts tarnished BUDWEISER
mark); Coca-Cola Co. v Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(finding that "Enjoy Cocaine" posters tarnished ENJOY COCA-COLA mark).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A), (C) (2000).
107. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003)
("Whether [tarnishment] is actually embraced by the statutory text [of the FTDA],
however, is another matter.").
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tip the social welfare calculus in favor of the third-party use. For exam-
ple, when testifying before Congress, a Warner Brothers witness used the
real-life example of a third party portraying cartoon figure Bugs Bunny
smoking a marijuana cigarette as trademark dilution harming Warner
Brothers' image.'0 8 The witness described this as a "counterfeit" use of
the mark rather than tarnishment. 10 9 Perhaps Warner Brothers framed
the example as counterfeiting because true counterfeit goods often pre-
sent an example of demonstrable social harm whereas tarnishment cases
frequently present issues of parody or criticism, which can have positive
social benefits.
A somewhat more ambiguous case of harm to the trademark holder
is blurring, which occurs when a third party uses a famous mark to iden-
tify its own product in a nonderogatory way. The classic example is the
mark TIFFANY being used as the name of a restaurant. °1 0 Assume it is an
upscale restaurant, so that tarnishment by association with low-quality
goods is not an issue. Customers are unlikely to confuse the jewelry store
with the restaurant, but the same name is now being used to identify two
different products. Whereas tarnishment presents a relatively clear case
of harm to the trademark holder but also a greater chance of positive
social value arising from the third-party use, blurring by contrast presents
a case where the harm to the trademark holder and the social benefit of
allowing the unauthorized third-party use are both hard to identify.
Commentators have argued that blurring can harm consumers by
increasing search costs because it increases the cognitive costs to consum-
ers of identifying the context in which a mark is used. 1 ' Blurring occurs
when, for example, the use of TIFFANY for a restaurant causes consum-
ers to devote more mental energy to distinguishing the use of TIFFANY
for the jewelry store. If use of the same mark by two different parties on
unrelated goods increases consumers' search costs-and there is some
empirical evidence that blurring does increase search costs in some
cases1 12- harm may be demonstrable from a consumer's perspective, but
108. See Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 111 (1995) [hereinafter Trademark Dilution Act
Hearings] (statement of Nils Victor Montan, Vice President and Senior Intellectual
Property Counsel, Warner Brothers).
109. See id. at 103 ( "I spend a lot of my life chasing people who counterfeit T-shirts
and the like . . ").
110. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
111. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 Gonz. L. Rev. 277, 306-07 & n.114 (1998)
("Dilution by blurring is concerned with preventing the erosion of the distinctiveness of
the mark because of its use on non-related products. The 'noise' that this creates around
the mark may increase consumer search costs.").
112. See, e.g., Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19J. Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 265, 274 (2000) (showing
that even when consumers correctly matched trademarks with products, they took longer
to do so if mark was associated with more than one product).
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it is less clear from a producer's perspective. In the absence of confusion
or tarnishment, how has a trademark holder been harmed simply be-
cause consumers now associate its mark with more than one source or
product? One response is that consumers may have to share their atten-
tion between two sources or products associated with the same mark-for
example, the restaurant and the jewelry store-and will devote less atten-
tion to the jewelry store. To say that this injures the jewelry store, how-
ever, presupposes that it has a right to a consumer's attention span, an
argument that is hard to make with a straight face. Some scholars have
argued that harm to consumers is the only appropriate measure of harm
for dilution law,113 and that dilution of a mark causes no harm unless
consumers experience higher search costs.' 14 If so, blurring is the easier
case and tarnishment the harder one, because the more startling the jux-
taposition of a famous mark on an undesirable product, the lower the
cognitive costs necessary to keep the two products distinguishable in the
consumer's mind. One of the conceptual problems of tarnishment, how-
ever, is that it can also be explained as a subset of blurring since it
reduces the distinctiveness of the trademark by associating it with two dif-
ferent products, even in the absence of confusion.1 15
Dilution law may contemplate a third harm, in addition to tarnish-
ment and blurring: that of free riding.1 6 The FTDA created a trade-
mark entitlement that allowed holders to control a broad range of uses of
the mark, the violation of which would be similar to trespass. 17 Congress
may have intended to let trademark holders internalize the positive exter-
nalities created by their famous marks and, by extension, to create incen-
tives to increase the supply of famous marks. (Congress's rationale begs
the question of whether there is an undersupply of famous marks, or
whether preexisting incentives to create famous marks are insuffi-
cient. 1 8 ) At the time of the FTDA's passage, one witness testifying before
113. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777, 790-91 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs] ("[D] ilution-at least as properly understood-
turns on injury to the informative value of a mark." (footnote omitted)).
114. See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked
Licensing, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1759, 1766-67 (2006) (arguing that if use of same
trademark on two different products does not increase search costs, there is no harm).
115. See 7i Inc., 306 F.3d at 511 ("Analytically [tarnishment] is a subset of blurring
116. See Franklyn, supra note 6, at 117 ("[Wlhile American dilution law purports to
be about preventing dilutive harm, it really is about preventing free-iding on famous
marks.").
117. See 2 McCarthy, Unfair Competition, supra note 45, § 24:13, at 24-213 ("The
underlying rationale of the dilution doctrine is that the gradual diminution or whittling
away of the value of a trademark, resulting from use by another, constitutes an invasion of
the senior user's property ight and good will in his mark and gives rise to an independent
wrong.").
118. But see Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 Yale LJ. 1717, 1730 (1999) ("An argument that we would have an
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Congress stated that enactment of the FTDA "would recognize that the
preservation of a mark's uniqueness or singularity is a valuable property
right."1 19 Another witness argued that "[t]he basic point [of dilution
law] is that the trademark owner who has spent the time and investment
needed to build up the goodwill in these marks should be the sole deter-
minant of how the marks are used in a commercial sense" and urged
Congress to treat dilution as "a form of trespass on property."120 Con-
gress's reference to trademark owners' "substantial investment" in their
marks, and the "aura" and "goodwill" surrounding a mark, suggests that
the legislature bought this rationale. 12 1
On this view, famous marks present a classic public goods problem.
The cost of creating a public good-in this case a valuable mark with
positive consumer associations-is high, but once the public good is cre-
ated the cost to third parties of using it is low.12 2 In the absence of a right
to exclude, creators of famous marks will not be able adequately to inter-
nalize the benefits of creating such marks and will therefore under-
produce such marks. Exclusionary rights would allow creators of famous
marks a greater opportunity to enjoy the profits associated with their
marks, thus creating incentives to produce and maintain famous marks.
Indeed, some commentators have identified free riding on the goodwill
of a trademark as a source of dilution's harm. 123 If this is the case, then
dilution law may also be directed at preventing third parties from simply
using, and in the process benefiting from association with, a famous
mark. 124
The harm of free riding is not easy to identify. The Congressional
testimony pertaining to the passage of the FTDA suggests that some advo-
cates were concerned with making sure rivals did not get a competitive
advantage.1 25 As one witness stated: "Diluting [users] of famous trade-
undersupply of good commercials if advertisers were not given plenary control over the
elements in their ads cannot be made with a straight face.").
119. Trademark Dilution Act Hearings, supra note 108, at 73 (statement of Mary Ann
Alford, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property, Reebok
International Ltd., and Executive Vice President, International Trademark Association).
120. Id. at 102 (statement of Nils Victor Montan, Vice President and Senior
Intellectual Property Counsel, Warner Brothers.).
121. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
122. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:
Economic and Social Factors 609, 614-16 (1962) (describing public goods phenomenon as
related to patented goods); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 995-96 (1997) (describing intellectual
property and public goods problem).
123. See Franklyn, supra note 6, at 117 (arguing that U.S. dilution law "really is about
preventing free-riding on famous marks").
124. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (noting that these laws "protect famous marks
from unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and established renown
of such marks").
125. See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Act Hearings, supra note 108, at 94 (statement of
James K. Baughman, Assistant General Counsel, Campbell Soup Co.) ("Piggy-backing on
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marks typically derive a commercial benefit from the dilution. Doing
business under a well recognized brand provides the junior user with the
sort of name recognition and brand imagery that can create a tangible
competitive advantage in its own marketplace." 26 If this is so, then the
harm from dilution is that a third party gets a competitive boost from
using the famous mark. This argument implies that the mark creates a
positive externality that the trademark holder cannot completely capture,
so another user ought not to benefit from it either. Underlying this argu-
ment are the assumptions that a third party who derives a competitive
benefit from the use of a famous mark without permission must be in-
flicting a harm on the trademark holder and that this harm should be
prohibited. One problem with this argument, however, is that a third-
party user accused of dilution does not need to be a competitor of the
trademark holder.12 7 If the third party is not a competitor of the trade-
mark holder and is deriving a benefit from the mark in its own unrelated
market, the harm inflicted on the trademark holder is attenuated at best.
If one goal of dilution is to prevent free riding, then dilution law
starts to look somewhat like a right of publicity for corporations, which
will be the owners of most famous trademarks. Both regimes recognize
reputation as a valuable asset. A right of publicity, which is recognized in
some states, prohibits the misappropriation of an individual's persona-
usually name or likeness-for commercial purposes. 128 Justifications for
the right of publicity are often couched in terms of preventing free rid-
ing.129 Fame is a relevant element under both regimes. An individual's
fame is often a proxy for the commercial value of his or her persona. The
personas of people who are not famous are less recognizable and there-
fore unlikely to be subject to misappropriation. And like rights of public-
ity, dilution law confines itself to commercial contexts. 130
Some important considerations should give us pause, however,
before we import free riding-based justifications for the right of publicity
into dilution law. Only persons have rights of publicity and such rights
the reputation of a famous trademark will, consequently, gradually erode the goodwill
attached to the trademark, but it will also give the junior user an unfair, long lasting and
valuable competitive advantage.").
126. Id. at 93.
127. Dilution law is not limited to competing products or firms. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2000) (stating that dilution may occur even in absence of competition between trademark
owner and third-party user).
128. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) ("One who
appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the
person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability."); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
("[T]he protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment
required to produce a performance of interest to the public.").
129. See Franklyn, supra note 6, at 143 n.152 ("The anti-free-riding impulse ... also
finds expression in the right of publicity.")
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (granting remedy only for diluting use in
commerce).
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usually terminate upon the individual's death,13 1 whereas dilution law
confers rights on corporations, which are immortal legal actors. Thus,
not only are the rightsholders different, but the temporal reach of dilu-
tion law's protection is potentially longer than that of the right of public-
ity. Also, unlike personas, trademarks are communication goods by their
very nature. Because trademarks have communicative functions, grant-
ing trademark holders the right to control all uses of their marks would
create social costs along many margins, not least of which is stifling
speech and communication. Thus, careful limits need to be placed on
dilution as an entitlement.
One way to limit dilution law is to confine protection to the most
valuable marks. Not all marks will be equally valuable, If dilution law is
intended to protect against harm to a valuable mark, or additionally to
provide incentives to create valuable marks, then there must be a proxy
for a mark's value. Fame is one such proxy. Marks are cheap to create, so
we most likely do not need incentives for mark-creation per se. What is
expensive is creating a mark that is both well known and well regarded.
By limiting protection to famous marks, the statute attempts to identify
those marks whose costs to create and maintain will be high. Fame is
subjective and hard to define, so Congress explicitly left to the courts the
determination of which marks are famous. 132
Courts have struggled, and continue to struggle, to identify the harm
dilution law is trying to prevent. The elusiveness of the injury has contrib-
uted to thejudiciary's increasing unwillingness to enforce dilution claims.
The nature of dilution's harm came to the fore in Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue. 3 3 In Moseley, the Supreme Court concluded that protection of
consumers is not the primary purpose of the FTDA, but what harm trade-
mark holders must suffer in order to recover remains unclear.1 34 Moseley
held that plaintiffs in dilution cases must prove "actual dilution. 1 35 Most
courts and commentators since have interpreted this as requiring proof
of actual harm,1 36 but key questions remain unanswered: What harm
must plaintiffs show? How great must the harm be before a trademark
holder can get a remedy? When will harm to a trademark holder be off-
set by the social benefit of allowing the use?
131. Some states allow the right of publicity to survive death. See, e.g., Martin Luther
King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga.
1982) (holding that right of publicity is descendible).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (indicating that courts are not limited to famousness
factors listed in statute).
133. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
134. See id. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement law, [passage of the FTDA was]
not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
135. Id. at 433.
136. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th
Cir. 2004); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 113, at
n.42 (2004).
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B. The Social Welfare Calculus
Courts often appear to be balancing the harms and benefits of en-
joining unauthorized third-party use of a mark. There is a discrete set of
instances in which the benefits of the dilution form of protection out-
weigh the costs, but a larger set of circumstances in which dilution law
creates a net social cost. Thus, it becomes important not just to confine
enforcement to social welfare-enhancing instances, but also to recognize
the forces that will push cases in one direction or the other. The dilution
statute, however, contains few mechanisms to separate welfare-enhancing
from welfare-diminishing cases. Adjudicators seeking to justify recovery
in one circumstance but not another must often look outside the few
limitations of the statute.
One circumstance in which the net social benefits of dilution en-
forcement will often outweigh the net social costs arises when a third
party is using a counterfeit mark.1 3 7 This is not to say that counterfeiting
is the only instance when the costs of allowing infringement under a dilu-
tion theory will outweigh the benefits, just that it is a readily identifiable
one. Some commentators have argued that classic trademark law is suffi-
cient to handle counterfeit trademarks.13 8 If this is not the case, how-
ever-and the successful use of dilution claims to enjoin counterfeiters
suggests that dilution law does have a role to play in combating counter-
feitingl 3 9-and even assuming consumer confusion is not an issue, the
social benefits from falsely labeling a generic watch ROLEX are likely to
be outweighed by the social costs resulting in the diminution in value of
the mark when attached to a real ROLEX brand watch.
Consider the harms and benefits to trademark holders from the un-
authorized use of their mark on another's goods. The costs to trademark
holders can be positive, zero, or negative (i.e., trademark holders are
benefited by third-party use). Costs to the trademark holder are positive
when, for example, unauthorized third-party use of a trademark diverts
sales because consumers buy a cheaper product bearing a counterfeit
mark rather than pay a higher price for the authorized version. The
markholder may suffer a cost because unauthorized third-party use di-
minishes positive consumer perceptions of the trademark. Conversely, it
is possible (albeit unlikely) for a trademark holder to be benefited by a
third party's unauthorized use of the mark if the use gives the mark more
137. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D.
Ga. 2003) (holding that defendant's sale of clothing bearing counterfeit NIKE marks
identical to plaintiffs legitimate marks was dilution); see also Landes & Posner, Economic
Structure, supra note 30, at 208-09 (arguing that purchasers of counterfeit copies of a
good blur signal of desirable characteristics given out by purchasers of genuine good).
138. See, e.g., Klerman, supra note 114, at 1762 n.9 ("[K]nockoffs can be controlled
through traditional trademark infringement law, so recourse to dilution is unnecessary.").
139. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756,
764-65 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (granting injunction to General Motors against counterfeiter);
Nike, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (using dilution law to enjoin counterfeiter).
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"airtime" in front of consumers. 140 For this to be true, we have to assume
that the determining factor of a mark's value is the quantity rather than
the quality of publicity a mark receives.
How can an adjudicator tell if there is harm to the trademark holder
from the unauthorized use? A quick proxy for there being harm to the
trademark owner is the suit itself. If a trademark holder seeks injunctive
relief, it probably believes it experiences harm from the unauthorized
third-party use. The harm may be indirect or attenuated, such as the
impression that the trademark holder is unlikely to enforce other legal
rights if it does not enforce its intellectual property rights, but indirect
harm is nonetheless harm.
Against any putative harms to the trademark holder must be weighed
the costs and benefits to consumers of counterfeit marks. Suppose con-
sumers are getting satisfaction from buying goods with counterfeit trade-
marks that they think are genuine. Although it is theoretically possible
that fooling consumers results in a net social benefit, such a circumstance
is unlikely. Cases of consumer confusion provide even fewer social bene-
fits than cases in which consumers are not confused, all else equal, and
present an even stronger argument for enforcement of trademark
rights."4 Suppose instead it is potential consumers (but not the direct
buyers of the falsely branded goods) who are confused about whether a
good is the genuine article. One reason consumers knowingly buy coun-
terfeit goods is because friends, relations, or other observers will be
fooled into thinking the good is genuine. Such purchasers are trying to
signal that the goods-or perhaps by extension, the purchasers them-
selves-have positive characteristics they do not necessarily possess.' 42 Al-
though there may be advantages to allowing purchasers to reap the bene-
fits of false signaling, this must be balanced against the harm to third
parties from being fooled, coupled with the harm to trademark holders
from the potential unraveling of the high-quality signal that the trade-
mark sends.
What if consumers are not confused? Assume neither the original
purchaser nor potential consumers who see a falsely branded good after
purchase are confused as to its counterfeit nature. What would it take for
the social benefits of the counterfeit mark to exceed the social costs?
Consumer utility that arises from the counterfeit good's lower cost-or
140. See, e.g., Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th
Cir. 1998) (discussing possibility, in likelihood of confusion context, that harm to plaintiff
trademark holder might be "somehow offset by any extra goodwill plaintiff may
inadvertently reap as a result of the confusion between its mark and that of the
defendant").
141. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Economic Structure, supra note 30, at 208-09.
142. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law,
27J. Legal Stud. 765, 772 (1998) (discussing consumption of expensive goods as means of
attempting to signal desirable qualities). Thorstein Veblen originated the argument that
conspicuous consumption was a method of signaling desirable qualities such as wealth.
See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 85 (Penguin Books 1979) (1899).
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more specifically from the cost-to-quality ratio being lower than the cost-
to-quality ratio of the genuine article-does not depend on the presence
of the false trademark. Such benefit should not enter into the social wel-
fare calculation surrounding dilution law.
Consumers might derive psychic satisfaction from counterfeit marks
that fool no one. Consumers may derive utility from the "look-alike" fac-
tor of the counterfeit good. Perhaps they find the mark aesthetically
pleasing even in its unauthorized form and do not want to pay full price
for the genuine mark. 14 3 But if a trademark is so aesthetically pleasing
that consumers do not care about its source-identification function and
are not using the mark as a source identifier, then trademark protection
is probably inappropriate to begin with. 144 Consumers might also derive
satisfaction from the exclusivity and scarcity of a trademarked good, a
scarcity that counterfeit copies diminish. t 45 Offsetting the benefit to con-
sumers of the counterfeit good from sharing in the feeling of exclusivity
are the costs incurred by existing or potential owners of the
noncounterfeit good who seek a new status good to consume-one
whose scarcity remains acute. 146
Instances of parody and satire (to the extent we can even call the use
of such marks counterfeiting), in which consumers are not fooled as to
the provenance of the mark yet they derive utility from the fact that the
mark is not the real thing, can yield a net positive social benefit.14 7 If the
social benefit is positive, trademark holders should lose on their dilution
claims. Excluding parody, satire, and other forms of (truthful) communi-
cation using the mark, in most cases the harm to trademark holders from
the counterfeit uses of their marks will be positive and the net social ben-
efit to consumers small. Counterfeiting cases, therefore, present one ex-
ample where injunctive relief on a dilution claim usually ought to be
143. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 961 (1993)
(arguing that there is "growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products
but also to enhance or adorn them, even to create new commodities altogether").
144. See, e.g., Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 1998)
("Gold is a natural color to use on a fancy cookbook."); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198
F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (stripping away trademark protection when aesthetically
pleasing nature of trademark conferred market power over good itself). For a slightly
unusual take on aesthetic functionality, see Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co.,
713 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating in dictum that use of FORD on
automobile floor mats by maker of replacement floor mats is "functional" because it is
"designed to help the mats contribute to a harmonious ensemble of accessories and
decorate the interior of a car"), vacated after settlement and consent decree, 767 F. Supp.
1036 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
145. Such goods are known as Veblen goods. See Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising
Right, supra note 38, at 491-92 (discussing Veblen goods).
146. See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29J.L. & Econ. 211,
214 (1986) (arguing that counterfeit goods harm consumer expectations about social
signal of owning good).
147. Cf. Trademark Dilution Act Hearings, supra note 108, at 103 (statement of Nils
Victor Montan, Vice President and Senior Intellectual Property Counsel, Warner Brothers)
(referring to example of parody of Bugs Bunny and Tasmanian Devil as counterfeiting).
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granted. For the most part, courts of late have been getting this result
right. In recent years, the dilution claims that do get injunctive relief
often involve counterfeit goods.' 48
The net costs of such control over a trademark must be weighed
against the net benefits. If, for example, trademark holders were allowed
to enjoin truthful criticism or discussion of their trademarks by others,
this would create a social cost in the form of diminished truthful speech.
Recognizing this, the dilution statute creates privileges for comparative
advertising by competitors using the trademark, for media use of the
trademark, and for noncommercial use of the mark. 149 But even with
these limitations, the social costs of dilution law may still exceed the social
benefits of allowing producers to internalize consumer goodwill. For ex-
ample, noncomparative speech involving the trademark, such as parody,
is not explicitly covered by a statutory privilege. If trademark holders
were allowed to shut down parodic or critical speech involving the mark,
dilution law may prove to create a net social loss. Another example is if
the net avoidance costs incurred by other producers attempting to avoid
the mark exceed the value of the goodwill reaped by the mark holder.
Yet another example of a potential social welfare loss arises because
strong trademark protection can create servitudes on goods. 150
Unfortunately, the FTDA does not contain many limitations or other
tools that can help courts distinguish social welfare-enhancing third-party
uses of the trademark from social welfare-diminishing third-party uses of
the trademark, whatever such uses may be. If interpreted exactly as writ-
ten, the dilution statute creates the opportunity to enjoin many instances
of third-party trademark use that do not present clear cases of harm. In
the early years of dilution law, such outcomes were not uncommon, as
courts issued injunctions against third parties whose use of another's
mark was unlikely to create a net social cost.15 1 Over time, courts increas-
ingly have been reading limitations into dilution law to prevent recovery
in cases with which they are uncomfortable. Because economic analysis
of dilution law to date has been patchy at best, courts generally have
framed neither their discomfort nor the ensuing limitations on the the-
148. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756,
764-65 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (enjoining defendant's use of General Motors' trademark on
counterfeit automobile parts); Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352,
1374 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (enjoining defendant's use of NIKE mark on counterfeit socks and
clothing).
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000).
150. See infra Part III.D.
151. See, e.g, Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1633 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(finding HAHA mark to infringe WAWA mark under dilution theory); Gazette
Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688, 696-97 (D. Md. 1996) (finding
"Frederick Gazette" to infringe upon GAZETTE mark for chain of newspapers).
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ory of dilution in cost-benefit terms. 15 2 Judges seem to know there is
something wrong with dilution law as written, but have not quite been
able to tell what the problem is at a level above the purely doctrinal. As a
result, each circuit has developed its own set of tools for cabining the
statute, but the social welfare implications underlying these developments
remain unexplored. The rest of this Article analyzes a few common types
of moves courts make in an attempt to limit dilution law and shows some
of the larger social welfare concerns those moves address.
C. Avoidance Costs
One theme that surfaces often in dilution law is judicial concern with
limiting the kinds of marks that receive protection. Courts consistently
find ways to deny dilution protection to trademarks when it is difficult for
third parties to identify whether a particular thing serves as a trademark
or when it is costly for third parties to determine whether a mark is eligi-
ble for dilution protection. 15 3 Put another way, courts generally create
limitations that make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover when avoidance
costs-the costs to third parties of avoiding infringement-are high.
Judges are not using avoidance-cost language (or even third-party con-
cerns) explicitly as a basis for their results. Whether intended or not, the
practical result is that, generally speaking, the harder it is for defendants
to avoid getting enmeshed in a dilution suit the less likely courts are to
enjoin defendants. This Part examines a few of the ways in which courts
are creating limitations that separate out and deny protection in high
avoidance-cost cases.
1. The Nature of the Trademark. - Nothing in the statute limits the
antidilution provisions to any particular kind of trademark. (Recall that
"trademarks" are not literally limited to words, but can also include pic-
tures, product packaging, design, color, sound, scent, and ambience. 15 4)
Early interpretations of dilution law applied it across the board to a range
of subject matters within the big tent of trademarks. For example, the
Second Circuit, which of all the circuits has been one of the greatest
friends to dilution law-not that that is saying much-upheld a prelimi-
nary injunction that had been granted to protect the shape of a cracker
from alleged dilution. 155 Many courts (including the Second Circuit in
later cases), however, quickly limited the subject matter to which they
would apply dilution protection. Most circuits that have considered the
issue will work hard to deny dilution protection for anything that is not a
152. For one of the few cases that presents some economic analysis of dilution law, see
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (discussing
imagination costs and free riding).
153. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998)
(denying protection to product design).
154. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
155. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1999) (comparing
Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish crackers with Nabisco's CatDog crackers).
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word, logo, symbol, or picture.1 56 In I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.,
for instance, the First Circuit declined to apply dilution law to product
design-in this case the shape of a bathroom faucet-stating that "[w]e
doubt that Congress intended the reach of the dilution concept under
the FTDA to extend this far."' 57 The court justified its move by explain-
ing that "[w] here words are the marks at issue it is easy to understand that
there can be blurring and tarnishment .... What is much more difficult
is to see how dilution is to be shown where some of a design is partially
replicated. ' 18
Here the Lund court appears to be grappling with a subtle issue:
that of how third parties are supposed to recognize and avoid the bound-
aries of protected trademarks. On paper at least, dilution looks like a
fairly bright-line entitlement that consolidates a wide array of use rights in
trademark owners. Correspondingly, dilution places stricter duties of
avoidance on third parties than does classic trademark law. This requires
third parties to ascertain the elements of the protected trademark so as to
avoid infringing it. By contrast, classic trademark law, with its likelihood
of confusion standard, conveys a thinner bundle of use rights to the
trademark owner. Under a likelihood of confusion standard, the trade-
mark owner has the right to exclude others from confusing uses, but not
more than that.1 59 Historically, this meant use of the same trademark by
two or more firms on noncompeting products-such as CAMPBELL for
soup and for a property management company-would usually be
deemed nonconfusing and therefore noninfringing.
In some ways, dilution law's avoidance costs on paper are lower than
those of classic trademark law. Whereas classic trademark law's infringe-
ment inquiry is nuanced and detailed, dilution's appears less so: If firm B
uses firm A's famous mark without firm A's permission and that results in
the diminution of distinctiveness of A's mark, that is infringement unless
the use is covered by one of the statutory privileges of comparative adver-
tising, noncommercial use, or news reporting. 160 Put another way, dilu-
tion's harm is less contextual, whereas classic trademark infringement re-
quires third parties to determine whether their use of mark X would be
likely to cause confusion among reasonable consumers in the relevant
product market. By making the prohibited behavior less context-depen-
dent, dilution lowers avoidance costs along one margin.
But additional factors raise avoidance costs along other margins. In
recent years, the subject matter of trademark protection has expanded
outward to include source identifiers that tend to have higher definition
costs than traditional pictorial or literary marks. Examples include prod-
156. See, e.g., IP. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 50 (denying protection to product
shape).
157. Id. at 50.
158. Id.
159. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2000).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4) (A)-(C) (listing the three privileges).
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uct configuration, product design, and product ambience.1 6' Trade-
marks composed of words, logos, and pictures can be defined at fairly low
cost by a simple representation on paper. Product design, configuration,
and ambience, by contrast, often require thicker description to convey
the concept of the trademark. Third parties trying to fulfill their duties
of avoidance under either classic trademark infringement or dilution law
must notjust figure out the contexts in which they cannot use a protected
mark; they must also figure out the contours of what they must avoid. In
other words, third parties need to define marks in order to avoid them.
The higher the definition costs of the mark, the more costly avoidance
will be.
The word GOLDFISH as a trademark for Pepperidge Farm's fish-
shaped cracker is easier to define than the appearance of the same
cracker, although both the word and the appearance of the cracker are
trademarks. In part, this is because the word GOLDFISH is registered as
a trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) whereas
the appearance of the cracker is not.162 (Unlike a patent, a trademark
does not have to be registered with the PTO in order to be protected.)
Registering words, logos, and pictures but not product appearance with
the PTO is a move trademark owners often make. Even if the word
GOLDFISH were not registered, however, the boundaries of the trade-
mark GOLDFISH are easy to determine just by looking at the mark: They
are the letters G-O-L-D-F-I-S-H. There is not much room to expand or
contract this definition. Perhaps Pepperidge Farm could successfully
maintain after the fact that the zone of protection around GOLDFISH
also includes misspellings like "Goldfisch," but even so, there is compara-
tively little wiggle room. By contrast, the boundaries of trademark protec-
tion for the cracker's appearance are harder for third parties to measure
and are more amenable to expansion and contraction. A trademark con-
sists of the elements of a product that the trademark owner uses as a
source identifier for consumers, but this does not necessarily allow third
parties to identify the contours of the trademark with specificity.
163
Which features of the cracker are serving as a source identifier? Shape,
size, texture, color, smell, flavor? Probably some combination of these,
but third parties cannot really say for sure, at least not before litigation.
By refraining from registering the elements of the cracker that it consid-
ers to be its trademark, Pepperidge Farm has chosen not to commit itself
ex ante to a definition. In truth, Pepperidge Farm may not know what
elements of the cracker-shape, size, color, etc.-it considers to be the
trademark until a competitor comes along with a similar product. Then,
Pepperidge Farm has every incentive to claim that the definition of its
mark matches whatever the competitor is doing. Indeed, in Nabisco, Inc.
161. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
162. See Reg. No. 0739118 (1962) (GOLDFISH).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining term "trademark" as "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish" goods).
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v. PF Brands, Inc., Pepperidge Farm argued successfully that the similari-
ties ("color, shape, size, and taste") between the appearance of its cracker
and the appearance of its competitor's product (a fish-shaped cracker
that appeared as part of a mix of crackers labeled CATDOG) constituted
the elements of its protected trademark whereas the differences (the
baker's markings on each cracker and mix of crackers in the package)
did not.16
4
Now we can see why owners of the types of trademarks to which pro-
tection has been expanded in recent years have incentives not to register
their marks. The disadvantages of failing to register are few. Registration
puts third parties on constructive notice nationwide,1 65 but third parties
will have strict duties to avoid diluting famous marks regardless of
whether the marks are registered or not. Dilution law already imposes on
third parties relatively bright-line duties of avoiding a protected trade-
mark. By refraining from registering marks such as product appearance,
trademark owners reserve the chance to expand and contract the defini-
tion of their marks ex post.
Perhaps now we can better understand the move of most circuits to
confine the dilution entitlement to words, logos, symbols, and pic-
tures.1 66 Such trademarks, whether registered or not, tend to present
lower definition costs to third parties. Strict duties of avoidance are eas-
ier to fulfill when coupled with reasonable definition costs. Even when
left unregistered, the definition of such trademarks is less amenable to
after-the-fact manipulation. By contrast, trade dress such as product de-
sign, whether registered or not, tends to present high definition costs and
avoidance costs. Coupling strict duties of avoidance with marks having
unclear boundaries places high costs of avoidance on third parties.
2. Inherent Distinctiveness. - In addition to confining protection to a
subset of all types of marks, many circuits that have considered the issue
have come to confine protection to marks that are inherently distinctive,
or (writ large and a trifle simplistically) memorable enough to be associ-
ated with a particular product in consumers' minds from the very start of
the mark's use. 167 Never mind if the mark established distinctiveness or
164. 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (stating that federal registration of mark provides
constructive notice of ownership).
166. See, e.g., Planet Hollywood, Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815,
898-900 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that trade dress is not protected by FTDA).
167. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir.
2001) ("Because TCPIP's mark, 'The Children's Place,' as a designator of stores for
children's clothing and accessories, is descriptive, and thus, lacks inherent distinctiveness,
it cannot qualify for the protection of the Dilution Act."); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler
Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[A] mark that evokes an association with a specific
source only when used in connection with the particular goods or services that it identifies
is ordinarily not sufficiently distinctive to be protected against dilution." (citing
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25 cmt. 3 (1995))).
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became recognizable to consumers over time.' 68 It makes no difference
if the trademark holder claims that dilution began after the mark became
distinctive. On this view, marks that are distinctive but have secondary
meaning-that is, marks that have had to establish recognition over
time-fail to qualify for dilution protection.
Once again, the dilution statute nowhere mandates any such require-
ment. Instead, all it says is that a mark must be distinctive. 169 This is
nothing unusual; all trademarks must be distinctive in order to qualify for
protection, even under classic theories of trademark protection. In trade-
mark law, "distinctive" and "inherently distinctive" are terms of art.17 0 In-
herently distinctive marks are a subset of all distinctive marks. Distinctive-
ness simply means consumers associate a mark with a product. 71 By
requiring inherent distinctiveness (consumer recognition from day one)
when the statute demands only distinctiveness (consumer recognition),
courts narrow the set of marks to which dilution law applies.
3. Famousness. - The one requirement unique to dilution law that
Congress did explicitly impose on marks to qualify for protection is fa-
mousness.1 72 Congress then punted on the issue of exactly what makes a
mark famous. Instead, the statute sets out eight factors that can be used,
or not, as the court wishes. 173 These factors range from the degree of
recognition a mark has among consumers to the extent of the geographi-
cal trading area. Courts have gravitated toward those factors that tend to
make fame more difficult to establish. Early cases had little problem al-
lowing a regional mark to be declared famous, but later cases have gener-
ally rejected regional fame as meeting the famousness requirement.17 4
As another example, cases decided when the statute was new held that
168. See TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 98 ("The mark's deficiency in inherent
distinctiveness is not compensated by the fact that TCPIP's mark has achieved a significant
degree of consumer recognition.").
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (permitting injunction against third-party use of
mark that "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark").
170. See 1 McCarthy, Unfair Competition, supra note 45, § 11:2, at 11-435 to -436
(defining distinctiveness and inherent distinctiveness).
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
173. Specifically, the eight factors are:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which
the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H).
174. Compare Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1630 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding WAWA famous in Pennsylvania and surrounding states), with TCPIP Holding Co.
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fame in a product niche market was sufficient to establish fame for pro-
tection against trademark dilution, but most later courts have come out
the other way.17 5 All in all, proving the fame of a mark-at least for pur-
poses of qualifying for protection under the trademark dilution laws-is
becoming harder for many trademark holders. Raising the famousness
bar reduces the pool of trademarks that qualify for protection under the
FTDA and makes it easier for third parties to avoid infringement. The
more nationally famous a mark, the more likely third parties are to be
aware of its existence and the lower the costs of searching to determine
which marks are off-limits.
D. Trademarks as Servitudes
Strong trademark protection can create a servitude on goods. This is
one of the most intractable and hidden problems dilution law has
presented for courts. The servitude-on-goods problem has appeared in a
number of dilution cases, but to date no court has picked up on the exis-
tence of the servitudes, although judges have expressed discomfort with
the facts of the cases in which servitudes arise. 176 In these cases, judges
can quite clearly sense a problem but have not been able to define it
clearly. This is not surprising: Servitudes on personal property are
rare. 
1 77
Dilution can create a servitude on goods by allowing the trademark
holder to control what purchasers do with the product once the good has
been sold. In the case of many goods, the trade dress-the look and feel
of the good-is inseparable from the physical good itself. For example,
the look and feel of Lego blocks is indistinguishable from the blocks
themselves; the appearance of a Barbie doll is inseparable from the doll.
In these instances the intellectual property is inseparable from the tangi-
ble embodiment of the good. Under the exhaustion rule (also known as
the first sale doctrine), an intellectual property owner's power to control
the tangible embodiment of an intellectual good ends when the good is
v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting regional fame as
sufficient to establish fame under FrDA).
175. Compare Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378, 380
(5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting interpretation of FTDA that would require trademark owner to
"prove fame beyond its market"), and Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports
News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that niche market fame of
trademark entided it to protection), with TCPlP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 99 (doubting that
Congress intended to protect "marks that have enjoyed only brief fame in a small part of
the country, or among a small segment of the population"), I.P. Lund Trading ApS v.
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that famousness requires "national
renown"), and Heidi Ott A.G. v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1075-76 (D. Minn.
2001) (citing concerns that fame based on niche market would overprotect trademarks).
176. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir.
2003) (denying relief on grounds that defendant's use of trademarked good was
noncommercial").
177. See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449,
1455 (2004) (discussing rarity of personal property servitudes).
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sold.1 78 For example, buyers of a patented widget may do what they wish
with the widget, such as resell it or take it apart, without getting the pat-
entee's permission. What they may not do is make their own copy of the
widget. Similarly, purchasers of a copyrighted book have the right to do
what they like with the physical embodiment of the book-read it, burn
it, and so forth-without incurring liability.1 79 But they may not copy the
expressive content of the book.
Classic trademark law also contains the court-created rule that a pur-
chaser of a trademarked good has the "right to resell a branded item in
an unchanged state" so long as it does not give rise to consumer confu-
sion.1 80 Such a doctrine does not truly exhaust the trademark holder's
rights to control the good in commerce, however. For example, it does
not apply to goods that the purchaser has altered and then put into the
stream of commerce. t 81 It also does not create a general exhaustion rule
that can be applied to dilution claims. In the few instances in which
courts have been faced with the trademark servitude problem under a
classic likelihood of confusion theory, they have dealt with the issue by
determining whether consumers would be confused by the purchaser's
use of the plaintiffs trademark.1 8 2 Where purchasers have escaped liabil-
ity, it is not because the trademark holder's rights over the physical em-
bodiment of the good have been declared exhausted but because the
purchasers have been deemed not to have caused consumer confu-
sion. 18 3 Some courts have ruled that the exhaustion rule also does not
apply to parallel importation of gray market goods, even when consumers
are not confused. 184 Indeed long before federal dilution law was cre-
ated, some courts declared that a trademark holder's rights to control a
178. See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) (stating that
first sale doctrine gives purchasers of patented items right to use and resell item).
179. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.")
180. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 76 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Cardamone, J., concurring) (finding defendants created likelihood of
confusion with gray market doll).
181. Id. ("[I]t is well-recognized that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to
genuine goods which have been altered.").
182. See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987).
183. See id. There, the court stated:
Once a trademark owner sells his product, the buyer ordinarily may resell the
product under the original mark without incurring any trademark law liability.
The reason is that trademark law is designed to prevent sellers from confusing or
deceiving consumers about the origin or make of a product, which confusion
ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is sold.
Id. (citations omitted).
184. Original Appalachian Artworks, 816 F.2d at 76 ("[T]he 'exhaustion' doctrine does
not apply with equal force in the international context."). But see AECElecs., 810 F.2d at
1509 ("Trademark law generally does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true
mark even though such sale is without the mark owner's consent.").
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trademarked good after purchase can continue to persist postpurchase if
the trademark holder can demonstrate that goodwill surrounds its
mark. 18 5 Since dilution law is intended to protect consumer goodwill in a
mark, this implies that trademark's exhaustion doctrine might not apply
to dilution cases.
In the absence of an effective exhaustion rule to cut off the trade-
mark holder's ability to control the use of a product containing famous
trade dress inseparable from the product, dilution law gives trademark
holders rights that can follow the good into the stream of commerce. In
Liquid Glass Enterprises, Inc. v. Porsche AG, a car wax company used a
Porsche car in an advertisement to sell its own car wax. 1 86 The court in
Liquid Glass declared the look and feel of a Porsche car to be famous
trade dress. 187 That Liquid Glass used Porsche's trade dress in a commer-
cial context was clear; indeed, commercial use has been found on the
basis of even less seamy activity under the Lanham Act.1 8 8 It is questiona-
ble whether Liquid Glass's use of a Porsche car in an advertisement truly
caused harm by diluting the distinctive quality of the trade dress (the
court found harm by virtue of the use), but the speculative nature of the
harm did not prevent Porsche from stating a prima facie claim of in-
fringement. 189 Nor was Liquid Glass saved by the three statutory excep-
tions to liability-comparative advertising, noncommercial use, and me-
dia use.190  Strong dilution protection (here, essentially a straight
misappropriation theory of dilution) when applied to Porsche's trade
dress allowed Porsche the effective right to control at least some commer-
cial uses of the car ("diluting" uses, whatever those are) after purchase for
use in the ad.
185. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, 816 F.2d at 76; Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that exhaustion may apply if
trademark holder cannot show goodwill in mark). But see Philip Morris Inc. v. Cigarettes
for Less, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that its
goodwill was diminished and granting only limited relief), affd, 215 F.3d 1333 (9th Cir.
2000).
186. 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404-05 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that use of PORSCHE
trademark and image of PORSCHE car as trade dress in magazine and video
advertisements for car polish constituted actionable dilution).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that where no products were being sold or offered for sale, "use of the Internet is
sufficient to meet the 'in commerce' requirement of the [Federal Trademark Dilution]
Act").
189. Liquid Glass, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 405. As the court explained:
For many years, Porsche has endeavored to maintain its good will and reputation
for producing high quality products catering to an exclusive market of
automobile consumers. Liquid Glass's unauthorized use of Porsche's trademarks
and trade dress is likely to slowly whittle away the distinctiveness of Porsche's
marks, demeaning the Porsche cachet and blurring the value of its famous and
strong marks.
Id.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4) (A)-(C) (2000).
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The court in Liquid Glass was not bothered by the existence of a ser-
vitude on goods-indeed it did not discuss it at all-and granted Porsche
an injunction.1 9 1 But in more recent cases when strong dilution protec-
tion would create a servitude, judges have balked at allowing relief. Al-
though no court has yet drawn the connection between dilution protec-
tion and the power of trademarks to create servitudes, when strong
protection would allow trademark holders to control aftermarket uses of
the good, courts have usually found a way to cut off the trademark
holder's rights.19 2 This has often required a logical stretch, such as de-
claring a use that would be commercial in other contexts under the Lan-
ham Act to be noncommercial and therefore outside the ambit of dilu-
tion law's protection. 9 3
CONCLUSION
Dilution law as created by Congress in 1996 prohibits a wide range of
uses of a famous mark. Many cases that fall within its ambit present cir-
cumstances where the social benefits of the unauthorized trademark use
are positive but the social harm is unclear. Limitations and other mecha-
nisms are necessary if relief is to be consistently and predictably confined
to cases in which the harm caused by the unauthorized use outweighs the
benefit. Each circuit in its own way is creating its own set of limitations
on dilution law. The upshot, whether by design or not, is that relief is
usually being confined to cases where the social harm of the unautho-
rized use exceeds the social benefit. This winnowing process began even
before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Moseley. 19 4
Courts are tailoring an overbroad and ambiguous form of intellectual
property protection to correct for congressional exuberance, influence
by interest groups, or perhaps just haste. 19 5
The reining in of federal dilution law has largely been a bottom-up
phenomenon. Each circuit has created its own set of limitations, some
more directly supported by the statute than others, some more invasive
than others, and some more effective than others. Nationwide, it is clear
that dilution claims that fall within the parameters of the statute are be-
coming harder to win, but the contours of development within each cir-
cuit vary. Because the interpretation of dilution law is evolving quickly
and differently in each circuit, anticipating the precise development of
the law in each circuit can be difficult. Departure from previous Lanham
Act precedent does not make it easier for litigants to adapt and adjust.
Some of the limitations that are being created are only weakly supported,
191. Liquid Glass, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
192. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir.
2003).
193. Id.
194. Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2002).
195. See Klieger, supra note 42, at 834-40 (discussing speed at which FTDA was
passed by Congress).
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if at all, by the wording of the statute. Some are contradicted by prece-
dent arising out of other areas of the Lanham Act. Although the courts
have been confining relief in recent years to cases in which shutting down
unauthorized use is most likely welfare-enhancing, some of the limita-
tions are a stretch given the statutory language. 96 As this Article goes to
press, amendments to the FTDA have been proposed in Congress. 19 7
The pending amendments leave little doubt that Congress is responding
to some of the efforts by courts to trim back the dilution statute over the
past decade. Some aspects of the proposed bill incorporate the decisions
of the courts; 198 other parts reject the judiciary's interpretation of the
FTDA. 199
The story sometimes told of intellectual property rights in the past
few decades is one of relentless expansion. That intellectual property
rights have increased in strength, length, and breadth is unquestionable.
But the quantitative data and qualitative results presented here should
remind us that there are many mechanisms that affect the scope and
power of intellectual property rights. Judicial development of intellectual
property law is one of these mechanisms. Although the law as enforced is
not as easy to discover as the law on the books, examining enforcement
patterns is necessary to advance our understanding of the real effects of
intellectual property rights.
196. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir.
2001) (interpreting "distinctive" as "inherently distinctive"); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v.
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
197. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2d Sess.
2005).
198. See, e.g., id. § 2 (defining famous mark as one that is "widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States").
199. See, e.g., id. (stating that mark's distinctiveness may be inherent or acquired).
Such language would overturn the holdings of cases such as I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d 27, and
TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d 88, which require that a mark must be inherently distinctive in
order to qualify for dilution protection. The proposed bill also would overturn Moseley,
537 U.S. 418, by allowing trademark holders to prove merely that a third party's use is
"likely to cause dilution" rather than having to prove actual dilution. See H.R. 683 at § 2.
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APPENDIX A
NUMBER OF TRADEMARK FILINGS AND TERMINATIONS IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1996-2005200
Filed Terminated
% change from % change from
Number previous year Number previous year
January 1, 2005- 1,922 N/A N/A N/A
July 16, 2005
2004 3,430 -7.42 3,490 2.20
2003 3,705 6.77 3,415 3.23
2002 3,470 3.74 3,308 -10.16
2001 3,345 -18.43 3,682 -9.29
2000 4,101 4.40 4,059 11.66
1999 3,928 12.97 3,635 12.16
1998 3,477 7.22 3,241 7.11
1997 3,243 6.85 3,026 10.40
January 16, 2,867 2,616
1996-December
31, 1996
Total 33,488 30,472
200. For the number of cases filed, data for 2005 and 1996 were obtained from
PACER. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center, at http://pacerpsc.us
courts.gov/index.html. Data for 1997 to 2004 were obtained from U.S. Courts, Statistical
Tables, supra note 75, vols. 1996-2004, tbl.C-2. For the number of cases terminated, data
for 1996 were obtained from PACER. Data for 1997 to 2004 were obtained from U.S.
Courts, Statistical Tables, supra note 75, vols. 1997-2004, tbl.C-4.
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APPENDIX B
POINT OF TERMINATION OF TRADEMARK FILINGS IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURT, 1996-2004201
Total No Court action
court Total Term. Term. Termination during or after trial
action before during Total Nonjury Jury % % of
pretrial or reaching trials
after trial to
pretrial jury
2004 3,490 1,211 2,279 1,893 344 42 22 20 1.2 47.62
2003 3,415 950 2,465 2,046 365 54 28 26 1.6 48.15
2002 3,308 896 2,412 1,987 360 65 30 35 2.0 53.85
2001 3,682 1,084 2,598 2,223 331 44 24 20 1.2 45.45
2000 4,059 1,148 2,911 2,474 368 69 42 27 1.7 39.13
1999 3,635 1,035 2,600 2,193 337 70 44 26 1.9 37.14
1998 3,241 835 2,406 1,975 363 68 32 36 2.1 52.94
1997 3,026 820 2,206 1,828 298 80 51 29 2.6 36.25
1996 2,741 703 2,038 1,713 253 72 44 28 2.6 38.89
Total 30,597 8,682 21,915 18,332 3,019 564 317 247
Average 3,400 965 2,345 2,037 335 63 35 27 1.88 44.38
per
year
201. See U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables, supra note 75, vols. 1996-2004, tbl.C-4.
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